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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays related to information technology and intangible capital.
The first essay, "Valuing IT-Related Intangible Capital," examines the value of intangible assets
in the firm. Using a panel of 130 firms from 2003-2006, we find that intangible assets are
correlated with significantly higher market values beyond their cost-based measures. Moreover,
we estimate that there is a 30-55% premium in market value for the firms with the highest
organizational IT capabilities as compared to those with the lowest organizational IT capabilities.
The second essay, "Has Information Technology Leveled the Competitive Playing Field?"
analyzes the relationship between IT and ordinary (non-IT) capital and the competitive dynamics
within U.S. industries. Using a panel of industry data from 1998-2005, when an industry
becomes more IT intensive, there is more entry and expansion of firms (including entry of new
small firms and expansion of large firms from the same and other industries). Yet there is also
more turnover of small firms in the industry as well as concentration of the industry into large
firms. In contrast, as an industry becomes more ordinary capital-intensive, there is less entry of
small firms and fewer establishment openings by large firms; a lower rate of turnover by small
firms; and fragmentation of the industry into small firms.
In the third essay, "The Value and Durability of Patents in High-Tech Firms" (co-authored with
Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin Hitt), we use data on publicly traded high-tech companies from
1984-2002 to examine the relationship between the firms' market value and their patent-based
intangible assets. We find that high-tech firms with patents that are cited by a wide variety of
other patents in different patent classes are worth significantly more than firms with patents that
are cited by a narrow range of patents. Patent generality is especially valuable in periods of
change, when firms are no longer at the leading edge of innovation in a particular year. In these
periods, we find that the value of diverse patents across technology categories is positive but not
significant and that generality is comparatively more valuable than diversity.
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Chapter 1
Valuing IT-Related Intangible Capital
Adam Saunders
MIT Sloan School of Management and
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
February 2011
As part of an effort to examine the value of intangible assets in the firm,
our study creates IT-related intangible asset stocks from firm-level
survey data. We also use data on IT-related business practices in order to
understand the distribution of IT-related intangibles, and we create asset
stocks to value research and development (R&D) and brand. Using a
panel of 130 firms over the period 2003-2006, we find that intangible
assets are correlated with significantly higher market values beyond their
cost-based measures. Moreover, we estimate that there is a 30-55%
premium in market value for the firms with the highest organizational IT
capabilities (based on a measure of HR practices, management practices,
internal IT use, external IT use, and Internet use) as compared to those
with the lowest organizational IT capabilities.
SAP supplied generous funding for this research. An earlier version of this essay, "An Asset Approach to
Information Value," was generously supported by the Oracle Center for Enterprise Information and Innovation
(OCEII). Lorin Hitt provided us with many valuable insights and suggestions with our model and empirical work.
We thank Paul Hofmann and Jason Yotopoulos from SAP, and the How Much Information? Project Principal
Investigators Roger Bohn and James Short for their advice and consultation. We thank Allyson Fryhoff at Oracle
Corporation for her encouragement and feedback. We thank and Peter Weill and Stephanie Woerner at the MIT
Center for Information Systems Research for her help in supplying us with the dataset from the Social and
Economic Implications of Information Technology (SeeIT) project, funded by NSF Grant IIS-0085725. We would
also like to thank Robert Gibbons, Birger Wernerfelt, the participants of the MIT Organizational Economics Lunch,
the participants of the MIT Center for Digital Business Lunch, the participants from the MIT Center for Digital
Business Annual Sponsors Conference, the How Much Information? Project Launch participants, the participants of
the 2009 Workshop on Information Systems and Economics, the participants of the 2010 International Conference
on Information Systems as well as the associate editor and two anonymous referees for excellent suggestions and
guidance. All errors of course, are our own.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to quantify the value of information technology (IT)-related intangible
capital. Although intangible assets are naturally difficult to measure, we utilize a novel approach
to doing so by using a market value estimation of a firm's various intangible assets. Our study is
the first to create asset stocks based on IT-related intangible spending at the firm level. We also
use data on IT-related business practices and management capabilities to analyze where this
value is distributed among firms. As part of a broader effort to value intangible assets of the
firm, we use market value estimation of research and development (R&D) and brand as well.
Using a balanced panel of annual data of 130 firms from 2003-2006, our results suggest
that IT-related intangibles are a significant driver of market value. We recreate the Brynjolfsson,
Hitt and Yang (2002) finding that $1 dollar of computer hardware is correlated with more than
$10 of market value, suggesting at least $9 of unmeasured intangible assets. We then account for
the "other $9" by broadening the definition of IT to include software, and then all IT-intangible
spending. The value of $1 of the broadest measure of IT is correlated with close to $1 of market
value, its theoretical value. Moreover, we demonstrate that these intangibles are not spread
evenly across firms. By replicating an organizational IT capabilities (ITC) variable from Aral
and Weill (2007), we estimate that firms with high ITC (1.5 standard deviations and above the
mean) are associated with 30-55% greater market value than the firms with low ITC (lower than
1.5 standard deviations below the mean). This effect works in order - high ITC firms are
correlated with significantly more value than average ITC firms, which in turn are correlated
with significantly more value than low ITC firms. We also find that one dollar of R&D and
brand is associated with significantly more than one dollar of value in a market value equation.
The motivation behind our research is that a company's intangible assets are not well
captured in government statistics or corporate balance sheets. The Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA), responsible for publishing the Gross Domestic Product and most other measures of the
economy, estimates that U.S. corporations held $12.5 trillion in equipment and structures at the
end of 2009.1 However, it does not estimate the value of intangible assets, such as organizational
2knowhow, human capital, and brands that are an important source of value for companies today.
The value of intangibles is not only missing from government sources; it is also largely absent in
corporate balance sheets. Current accounting standards dictate that virtually no intangible
investment can be capitalized, that is, treated as an investment and recorded on the balance sheet.
One of the few exceptions to this rule is purchased goodwill. When one company buys another,
the acquirer adds the net assets of the target to its balance sheet. The additional value of what the
acquirer paid over and above the net assets of the target is then added as goodwill to the
acquirer's balance sheet. Purchased goodwill, thus, does not include intangibles created outside
of mergers and acquisitions. Consider Google, undoubtedly built on a sea of intangible assets
and valued at more than $160 billion.3 The company lists a total of just $40 billion of assets on
its balance sheet, $5 billion of which is goodwill. Why is Google valued at $120 billion more
than the sum of its assets? Our hypothesis is that while intangibles are mostly invisible on the
balance sheet, they are reflected in the market value of companies today.
This does not just apply to companies in the information sector such as Google, but also
to traditional "brick-and-mortar" companies as well. We illustrate the difference between the
1 Source: BEA Fixed Assets Table 4.1. "Current-Cost Net Stock of Private Nonresidential Fixed Assets by Industry
Group and Legal Form of Organization", Line 13.
2 We note however that the BEA has begun publishing a parallel set of unofficial GDP statistics that treat R&D as an
investment rather than as an expense. The BEA plans to fully incorporate R&D as an investment in the core GDP
statistics by 2013 (Aizcorbe et al, 2009).
3 As of August 2010.
market value and balance sheet value of three traditional components of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average in Figure 1.
Recent studies have attempted to quantify the size of intangible assets in the U.S.
economy using aggregate data and have found vast amounts of uncounted capital. Corrado,
Hulten, and Sichel (2005, 2009) estimate that annual business investment in intangibles not
included in the U.S. government's official definition of investment could be $1 trillion per year.
This uncounted amount is about the same size as the official estimates of annual business
investment. They also estimate that the stock of uncounted intangible assets held by business is
$3.6 trillion. Nakamura (2001) uses aggregated data on expenditures on intangibles, labor
inputs, and corporate operating margins, and estimates that corporate intangible assets in the U.S.
economy could be as high as $5 trillion. We seek to contribute to this literature by providing
more precise estimates based on firm-level market value equations.
Our main contribution is to be the first to quantify the value of IT-related intangible
capital and demonstrate that this value is correlated with firms with more intensive IT practices
(e.g. internal IT use, external IT use, and Internet use) and superior management and HR
capabilities. Our 2003-2006~ dataset provides us with broader and more recent IT estimates than
can be found in currently published research by Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) that relies on
Computer Intelligence data from 1987-1997. In this paper, we build on their framework, that
used market value equations to demonstrate that $1 of computer hardware was associated with
more than $10 of value, and that this value was accounted for by a set of complementary human
resource practices. While IT-related intangible assets were the most plausible explanation for the
"other $9" of value, their data was limited to hardware only. With our expanded definition of
IT-related intangibles that measure software, internal IT services, external IT services, and IT-
related training, we estimate these values - the "other $9" - directly in a market value equation.
Our study complements and extends recent empirical work that uses financial markets to
value IT and intangible capital. Anderson, Banker and Ravindran (2003) use market value
equations relating the firm to its book value, earnings, R&D, and Y2K spending and find that the
value of a dollar of Y2K spending is correlated with an average of 30-40 dollars of market value
(with one estimate being as high as 62 dollars of market value). Their interpretation is that the
high values for Y2K spending were likely due to complementary investments in organizational
assets as well as improvements to the supply chain as a whole. While this is the most plausible
and intuitive explanation, they did not have the data to empirically demonstrate this. Our study
uses IT practice and capabilities data directly with intangible IT spending to analyze the size of
this intangible value and how it is distributed.
While existing studies have examined the relationship of IT, organizational capital and
market value, ours is the first to directly measure and quantify the IT-intangibles in an estimating
equation. For instance, Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) use the firm's sales, general, and
administrative (SG&A) expenses as a proxy for organizational capital in a sample of publicly
traded companies. They find this measure of organizational capital is significant in explaining a
firm's sales, and that this measure is also highly correlated with the firm's spending on IT.
Together, they explain market value beyond traditional measures such as book value and growth
potential. Their results, while quite powerful, rely purely on spending data, and our work builds
on their findings as we use organizational practice data as well as specific IT-intangibles
spending to estimate IT-related organizational capital.
We see our findings as complementary to the observation that IT investments are
significantly riskier than non-IT investments (Dewan, Shi and Gurbaxani, 2007). IT capabilities
are neither easy to create nor copy because they involve a system of practices. While copying
any one piece might be straightforward, an organizational system as a whole is difficult to
duplicate (Brynjolfsson, Renshaw and Van Alstyne 1997; Milgrom and Roberts 1990, 1995;
Porter 1996). Our finding that the highest ITC firms are correlated with 30-55% more value than
the low ITC firms fits perfectly in this framework. The rewards are higher for the firms that
have built an interlocking system of complementary IT capabilities because these investments
involved significant risk.
Our paper uses estimated values of R&D and brand directly in a market value equation,
complementing other approaches in the literature that value these intangibles using event studies,
production functions, and discounted ex-post future returns. Hand (2003), using a net present
value (NPV) profitability model, finds that the NPV of R&D and brand is significantly positive
and that the firms that were the largest spenders in R&D and advertising were the ones with the
highest returns to those assets. Lev (2004) notes that the companies with the highest amounts of
R&D capital had the highest risk-adjusted returns between 1983 and 2000, implying that "R&D-
intensive companies were systematically underpriced by the market," (Lev 2004, p.1 10). Barth
et al. (1998) finds that brand value estimates are a significant and positive predictor of share
prices and future returns. Using a production function framework, Seethamraju (2003) estimates
the value of trademarks, and finds this estimated value is reflected in share prices. These
approaches demonstrate that despite their absence from the balance sheet, R&D and advertising
are highly valuable investments and are subject to increasing returns to scale. Using the market
value equation framework, our paper is another lens to quantify the value of these intangibles.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines our
conceptual framework and is then followed by our econometric model. We then describe the
data used in this study, follow with our results, and conclude with a summary and implications
for future research.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
We begin with the simple, yet elegant principle that the total value of financial claims on
the firm should be equal to the sum of the firm's assets (Baily, 1981; Hall 2000, 2001). Our
underlying assumption is that financial markets provide an important way to value intangible
assets beyond the balance sheet and other input metrics. We model the value of financial claims
against the firm, MV, as the sum of each of its n assets, A (based on the model in Brynjolfsson,
Hitt and Yang 2002, pp.150-151):
n
MV = A, (1)
i=1
In other words, "If all assets can be documented and no adjustment costs are incurred in making
them fully productive, buying a firm is equivalent to buying a collection of separate assets. Thus
the market value of a firm is simply equal to the current stock of its capital assets," (ibid).
As noted earlier, while Google is valued at approximately $160 billion, the company lists
$40 billion in total assets on its balance sheet, of which only $5 billion is intangible. While we
can measure physical assets for publicly traded companies because of the accounting regulations
that require their inclusion in balance sheets, measuring intangible assets poses significant
challenges: With the exception of goodwill, they are virtually invisible on corporate balance
sheets.
One of the key contributions of this paper is to be the first to create several types of
intangible asset stocks and measure them directly in an empirical estimation of (1). That is,
rather than assume that the residual of the firm's market value above and beyond the firm's book
value is due entirely to intangibles, we construct measures for each intangible asset to estimate
directly. Put another way, we don't begin with the assumption that the other $120 billion of
Google's market value is the sum of its intangible assets. Rather, in our approach, we estimate
how much each type of asset - physical, financial, and intangible - contributes to the entire $160
billion.
Our null hypothesis is that a dollar's worth of an asset should contribute to one dollar of
market value. To test this, we construct three types of intangible asset stocks based on
aggregated historical spending to include in the market value equation: IT-intangibles,
advertising, and R&D. In the absence of these assets from the corporate balance sheet, we
estimate the relationship of our constructed measures and market value.
Even with an ideal dataset that could accurately measure both the tangible and intangible
assets of the firm, we would need to control for factors such as industry and year in an estimation
of (1). In any given year, the market value of two firms with identical quantities of assets that
operate in different industries will differ because of differences in industry growth rates, or
regulation, for example. There are also time-varying unobserved factors, such as excessive
optimism or pessimism on the part of investors, that necessitates controlling for year in an
estimation of (1).
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
To relate the market value of the firm to its various assets, we use the following
estimating equation:
A, = p0 + 81K± +3 3 IT + B4R,, + 0 5B.+ controlsit + E (2)
The value of all financial claims on the firm (equity plus liabilities) are placed on the left-
hand side and are represented by MV. (Subscripts i and t represent firm i in year t.) We list
various categories of assets on the right side of the equation. The first is physical, non-IT
(ordinary) capital, K. This includes non-IT equipment, structures, land, and inventories. Next is
financial assets, F, which represents total balance assets minus physical capital. This includes
receivables, cash, and other accounting assets such as goodwill. The next term is IT, which
represents information technology assets. We will use three different measures of IT in our
analysis. The first measure includes purchased hardware only, the second includes capitalized
hardware and software, and the third, broadest measure of IT includes all hardware and software,
internal IT services, external IT services, and IT-related training. The term R represents R&D
assets, and B represents advertising spending converted into an asset. We include controls for
year and industry, as well as dummy variables for firms that have zero R&D or firms for which
we impute advertising expenditures.
Given that our data is in panel form, we estimate equation (2) using Generalized Least
Squares (GLS) to correct for potential serial correlation of the error terms and heteroskedasticity.
Since one of our goals is estimating the distribution of IT-intangible capital between the firms in
sample, we do not use fixed effects or first-differencing as this would sweep away the effects we
are looking to measure. One of the principle assumptions in random effects estimation is that the
firm effect is uncorrelated with all of the explanatory variables. However, as Hall, Jaffe and
Trajtenberg (2005) note, this assumption would be inappropriate in estimating the value of R&D:
"R&D tends to change slowly over time, a firm's R&D intensity is highly correlated with its
individual effect; in fact, it is an important component of what creates differences across firms,
so removing these effects would entail an overcorrection, " (p.26). This can well apply to IT-
intangible spending as well. In addition, since the time period in our panel is relatively short, if
we use fixed effects or first differencing with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), any measurement
error in the slowly changing right-hand side variables is going to significantly bias the
coefficients downward (Griliches and Hausman, 1986).
To estimate the value of a dollar of ordinary capital, K, we adjust net property, plant and
equipment (PP&E), listed in net historical-cost dollars (based on the year the asset was
purchased) into a replacement cost, or current-cost measure (how much it would cost to purchase
the asset in that year). We use the unadjusted value of financial assets listed on the balance sheet
and assume this approximates a current-cost measure. To measure IT, R, and B, we use the
perpetual inventory method (PIM) to aggregate historical spending and create asset stock values
based on depreciation rates and price deflators from the BEA or BLS. If none exist (such as
depreciation rates for advertising), we use reasonable values based on the prevailing practice in
the literature.
Our null hypothesis is p1= #,2 = 13 = 84 = 35 = 1 If any of these coefficients are greater
than 1, then it means that firms, on average, are reaping greater value than the replacement costs
of those assets. This does not mean that there is a "free lunch" in the markets, especially when it
comes to intangible assets. If intangible assets carry more unpredictable upside payoffs, it is
reasonable to test p3,/4, P, = 1 against the alternative hypothesis that they are greater than 1.
This extra value could represent a market premium for the additional risk in those assets.
Another reason the coefficient can be above 1 is because of omitted variable bias.
Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) found $1 dollar of computer hardware was correlated with
more than $10 of market value. They reasoned that this was due to omitted IT-intangible capital.
When they included a measure of organizational practices interacted with hardware, the
coefficient on hardware alone fell significantly. With three different measures of IT ranging
from hardware only to a broad measure encompassing all IT spending on intangibles, we have
direct data to measure the "other $9" in an estimating equation.
When it comes to intangible assets, cost-based measures may not be enough to describe
their value. That is, if two manufacturing firms spend $20 million on bulldozers, it is reasonable
to expect that the inherent replacement value of this equipment is not firm specific. Yet this
reasoning does not apply well to intangibles. If two firms spend $20 million on an Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) system, it is reasonable to expect that the value of that system is going
to be firm specific. A number of recent papers have shown that complementary business
practices are necessary to get the full value from IT (Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2007; Bloom,
Sadun and Van Reenen, 2007; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2002; Brynjolfsson and Hitt
2003; Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang, 2002; Crespi, Criscuolo and Haskel 2007; Dedrick,
Gurbaxani, and Kraemer, 2003; McKinsey Global Institute, 2001, Pilat 2004).
To examine the distribution of IT-intangibles, we construct a variable to capture
management capabilities and organizational IT practices. This is based on the measure created
by Aral and Weill (2007) they termed organizational IT capabilities (ITC). We use this variable
to test whether most of the value from IT-related intangibles is concentrated in the firms with
high ITC.
We construct ITC as a standardized (mean 0, variance 1) variable. We then create four
dummy variables based on the firm's ITC score. If ITC is less than 1.5 standard deviations from
the sample mean, then ITCF = 1, otherwise, it is equal to 0. If ITC is between -1.5 and -0.5
standard deviations from the sample mean, ITCD = 1, otherwise it is 0. The variable ITCB =1
if ITC is 0.5 to 1.5 standard deviations above the sample mean, 0 otherwise, and ITCA =1 if
ITC is greater than 1.5 standard deviations from the sample mean, and 0 otherwise. The baseline
group is composed of firms for which ITC is between -0.5 and 0.5 standard deviations from the
sample mean, which we call ITC_C. (One can think of the F, D, C, B and A levels of ITC
similar to an academic letter-grade system). Using this set of dummy variables, we construct the
following estimating equation:
MV, = Po + pIK,, + P2 J + P3IT, + / 4R,, +5 ,BA
+P 6 ITC F+p7 TC _D+p 8ITC _ B+PITCA (3)
+p0IT, * ITC_ F + P11 IT * ITC_D + p1lT * ITC_ B+ 3I, * ITC _ A +controls+e,,
For the baseline group of ITCC firms, the total contribution of IT dollars to market value
would be p, . IT dollars. For an ITCF firm, the total contribution of IT dollars to market value
would be (,3 +#,) -IT + ,6 dollars. For an ITCA firm, the contribution of IT dollars to market
value would be (/,3 + #3) - IT +, dollars. Our null hypothesis is that the eight coefficients #6
through #13 are equal to zero.
DATA
Our data consists of a balanced panel of 130 publicly traded U.S. companies, representing
a broad cross-section of industries. With annual data from 2003-2006, we have a total of 520
observations. We construct our sample by starting with firms that are publicly traded and
participated in the Social and Economic Explorations of IT (SeeIT) survey, a two year effort by
the MIT Sloan School to poll companies about IT spending and technology usage. We match
those firms to Compustat, and eliminate firms with missing market value, total assets, or
ordinary capital. We drop a small handful of firms with implausibly high computer hardware
estimates (as compared to their measures of property, plant and equipment in Compustat).4 We
also eliminate companies headquartered outside the United States, to eliminate confounding
effects coming from companies subject to different tax laws, markets, culture or regulation. To
create a balanced panel, we keep firms that have complete data in every year from 2003 through
2006. All of the firm-level data is constructed on a fiscal year-end basis. We display the sample
summary statistics in Table 1.
We also exclude IT-producers, financial, mining, and oil companies. IT-producers face
different input prices for computer hardware and software than the rest of the economy (since
such firms use the IT they produce themselves). We drop firms with primary industry codes in
Computers and Semiconductors (NAICS 334); Software publishing (NAICS 5112); Information
and Data Processing Services (NAICS 514) and Computer System Design and Related Services
(NAICS 5415). We also exclude financial corporations (NAICS 52) because they are
fundamentally different from other firms in the economy, and have such high levels of financial
assets that it may affect our estimate for the coefficient of F. Mining and oil companies (NAICS
21, 324) hold significant assets that fluctuate with the market price of the underlying
commodities, yet such changes are not reflected on the book value of assets on the balance sheet.
4 Such as when the estimate for hardware is greater than all of property, plant and equipment, or when our estimate
for hardware is greater than all of equipment (meaning that non-IT equipment would be zero or negative).
Because of the large potential changes to the left-side variable (market value) without resultant
changes to the right-side variables, we exclude such firms.
Market Value
We define market value as the sum of all financial claims on the firm at the end of each
fiscal year, as shown in equation (4):
MV = PSTK +(PRCC_ F * CSHO)+ LT + ADJ (4)
MV, or market value, is the sum of four separate terms. The first is the value of preferred
stock (PSTK), the second is the price of common stock at the end of the fiscal year (PRCCF)
times the number of outstanding shares of common stock (CSHO), and the third is total liabilities
(LIT). The last term is an adjustment to the face value of long-term debt (DLTT), which reflects
the additional premium (or discount) of the market value of bonds to the face value of bonds. If
the market value of bonds is equal to the face value, this term is equal to 0.
For data to adjust long-term debt, we start with the Mergent Fixed Income Securities
Database, with data on approximately 180,000 corporate bond issues. We extract the unique
CUSIP identifier and issue information for each bond. We match this to the Trade Reporting
and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database, a product of the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA). The TRACE database represents more than 99 percent of U.S. corporate
bond market activity of 30,000 issuers. From January 2003 through December 2006, the
database contained more than 18 million trades. For each bond, we keep the last recorded price
for the close of the fiscal year. We aggregate the face and market values of all outstanding bonds
for each company, and match this to our sample. Finally, we use the ratio of the market value to
the face value of a company's outstanding bonds and apply it to the face value of the company's
long-term debt.
IT Capital
The IT spending and practice data comes from the SeeIT survey. The survey was
conducted using telephone interviews in 2005 and 2006 with a single point of contact in each
company. The data covers spending from 2003-2006, and IT practices in 2005 and 2006.
Approximately 600 companies participated in the survey and about half of them were publicly
traded. The majority of respondents were CIOs, in IT finance functions, or in IT project
management functions. The questions included the amount of computer capital in the firm, as
well as annual spending on hardware, prepackaged software, external IT services (e.g., business
process consulting, integration services), internal IT services (e.g. writing software, design,
maintenance, and administration), and IT-related training. (The IT practice questions are used to
construct an IT capabilities variable as described in Table 5.)
The firm-level IT spending data is summarized in Table 2. On average, each firm in our
sample spends $258.5 million per year on IT, of which $32.4 million, or about 12.5% is for
hardware. We convert this spending into three different measures of IT assets in our analysis,
moving from narrow to broad:
1. Purchased Hardware: This replicates the measure from Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang
(2002), who use hardware owned by the firm (whether or not it is capitalized).
2. Capitalized Hardware and Software: This represents what would be on the balance
sheet of the company. (Note this does not include the uncapitalized purchases of hardware that
were in the first measure.)
3. All IT: Our broadest measure of IT is capitalized, uncapitalized purchases, and leases
of hardware and software, as well as spending on other internal IT services, external IT services,
and training that we convert into asset stocks.
To create the three measures, we estimate what percentage of IT spending in each
category of Table 2 is capitalized. We use an industry-level Census survey to estimate the extent
that firms capitalize IT.5 The Annual Capital Expenditure Survey (ACES) contains the
Information and Communication Technology Supplement, categorizing hardware and software
spending into capitalized and uncapitalized amounts for each of the 20 major NAICS sectors.
We match the industry-level capitalization ratios to our firm-level data and list the
summary statistics in Table 3. In our sample, firms capitalized an average of 64.0% of their
hardware spending from 2003-2006, and this ranged from 51.2% to 84.7%. For software, while
an average of 53.1% of software spending was capitalized, it ranged between 26.5% and 68.7%.
In Table 4, we list our estimates of IT assets for the sample in 2003-2006. For instance,
the average firm held $34.2 million in purchased, capitalized hardware. We also estimate that
the average firm held another $10.8 million in purchased hardware that was not capitalized. This
is not listed separately in Table 4, rather we list the total of all uncapitalized hardware ($21.5
million) of which we estimate $10.8 million is purchased and $10.7 million is leased. Therefore,
our first measure of IT, purchased hardware, averaged $45.0 million ($34.2 + $10.8 million) per
firm during the sample period. Our second measure of IT, capitalized hardware and software,
averaged $202.9 million per firm. Our third and broadest measure of IT (which includes IT
services and training) averaged $562.9 million per firm.
To construct each of the IT assets listed in Table 4, we used the following methods:
5 We use an industry-level survey because we cannot observe firm decisions to capitalize IT in each year.
Hardware. We begin with total hardware spending as reported by the firm (Table 2, Line
1).6 This is an unadjusted figure from the year in which the hardware was purchased. We
convert each of these flows into a constant-dollar (2000) measure using the industry-specific
price deflator for computers and peripherals from the BLS. We divide each year's spending into
three categories, using the industry-level data from the ACES: Capitalized purchases (Table 3,
line 2), uncapitalized purchases (line 3) and leases (line 4). We use a three-year service life for
hardware and assume these investments are made halfway through the year (as is the practice of
the BEA and BLS). For example, the stock of hardware in constant dollars at the end of 2006 is
the sum of each constant-dollar flow from 2004, 2005, and 2006, depreciated at an average of
30.8% per year.7 The constant-dollar asset stock measure is then converted back into a current-
dollar, or replacement cost measure, using the price deflator for computers and peripherals in
2006. This is repeated to get current-dollar estimates from 2003-2006.
Because we use three years of flow data to calculate each year's worth of computer
assets, and our spending data covers 2003-2006, the 2003 and 2004 asset stocks include imputed
flow data (from 2001 and 2002). To impute this earlier hardware spending, we start with the
firm's reported spending in 2003, and apply the BLS industry-level growth rate of hardware
from 2001 and 2002 to create historical values of hardware spending.
Prepackaged Software: Similar to hardware, we convert all flow data reported as
prepackaged software by the firm into a constant dollar measure, and use price deflators and
6 Although the SeelT survey asked firms to report their stock of hardware, we create stocks from firm spending
rather than use reported hardware stocks because we are concerned whether the asset stock measures reported by the
firm truly reflect the replacement cost and not the historical cost. To be consistent between firms and with the other
asset stocks we calculate, we concluded it was more reliable to use reported spending totals from the years in which
the assets were purchased and apply appropriate price deflators and depreciation rates to create the asset stocks.
7 The rate of depreciation for computers and peripherals from the BLS is also industry-specific and depends on the
composition of hardware in each industry.
depreciation rates from the BLS. We use the industry-level capitalization ratios from the ACES
data to divide the spending into capitalized purchases, uncapitalized purchases, and leases. We
also use a three-year service life. We impute the 2001 and 2002 spending on prepackaged
software from the 2003 reported spending and the 2001 and 2002 industry-level growth rates of
prepackaged software investment from the BLS. The constant-dollar estimates are then
converted back into current-dollar estimates using the BLS price deflator for prepackaged
software.8
Custom software. As opposed to prepackaged software, which is ready to use off the
shelf, custom software "is tailored to the specifications of a business enterprise or government
unit" (BEA 2000, p.3). It includes expenses for programs as well as payments to freelance
programmers or outside organizations to develop the software.9
We begin with the firm's reported spending on External IT services and allocate it to
create two asset stocks: custom software, and miscellaneous External IT services. To identify
how to allocate this spending, we use the Service Annual Survey conducted by the Census
Bureau. We proxy for the industry providing all External IT services as NAICS industry 5415,
Computer System Design and Related Services. Revenue from this industry was $188.3 billion
8 For all asset stock calculations below, we do the following: 1) Use appropriate price deflators to convert nominal
flows into constant dollar flows; 2) Use the appropriate depreciation rates and service lives to create constant dollar
asset stocks; and 3) Convert each year's constant-dollar asset stocks into current-dollar asset stocks using that year's
price deflator.
9 The full definition from BEA (2000, pp. 3-4) is: "Custom software is software tailored to the specifications of a
business enterprise or government unit. It may include new computer programs as well as programs incorporating
preexisting or standardized modules. Expenditures for custom software include those for the development (analysis,
design, and programming) of software tailored to the business enterprise's or government unit's specifications. The
expenditures include payments to free-lance computer software writers and to consulting organizations and
individuals, who are not employees, who perform programming and systems analysis to support the development of
software. It also includes expenditures on tailored software that is modified by providers of software or
computerized equipment. The large majority of producers of custom software were previously classified in SIC
7371 (computer programming services) and are now classified in NAICS 541511 (custom computer programming
services)."
in 2006. The industry we proxy as custom software is NAICS 541511, Custom Computer
Programming Services, and is a subset of NAICS 5415. Revenue in NAICS 541511 was $64.3
billion in 2006. Thus, our estimated ratio of custom software spending to all External IT services
spending was roughly 34% (64.3/188.3) in 2006. We do this calculation in other years and find
this ratio to be steady from 2003-2006.
The 34% of External IT services spending that is allocated to custom software is further
divided into capitalized and uncapitalized portions. We use BLS depreciation rates and price
deflators for custom software, and use a five-year service life. We impute firm-level spending
for 1999-2002 from the BLS industry-level growth rates of custom software, applied to the 2003
firm-level value of custom software investment.
Own-Account Software: The definition of own-account software "is in-house
expenditures for new or significantly-enhanced software created by business enterprises or
government units for their own use," (BEA 2000, p.4).'" We begin with the firm's reported
spending on Internal IT services and allocate 50% of this to own-account software and the other
50% towards maintenance and administration, as is the current practice of the BEA (BEA 2000).
The 50% that is not part of own-account software is allocated to an asset stock we call
miscellaneous Internal IT services and is described further detail below.
10 The full definition of own-account software from BEA (2000, p.4) is: "Own-account software consists of in-
house expenditures for new or significantly-enhanced software created by business enterprises or government units
for their own use. These expenditures include: Wages, salaries, and related compensation (such as contributions to
pensions and for FICA), materials and supplies consumed, and indirect costs. The indirect costs include
depreciation of plant and equipment, utilities, travel, property and other taxes, maintenance and repair of plant and
equipment, and overhead--including personnel, accounting, and procurement. The expenditures are made for
analysis, design, programming, and testing of software and may be made by any industry... .Software-related
expenditures treated as investment exclude maintenance and repair expenditures on existing software, including
expenditures to fix so-called "Y2K" problems. In addition, in-house expenditures on software that is to be embedded
in computers and other equipment that is to be sold are excluded from software investment in order to avoid double-
counting."
For the part that is own-account software, we divide this into capitalized and
uncapitalized portions according to the industry-level ratios in the ACES data. We use the
depreciation rates and price deflators from the BLS, and use a 5-year service life. We impute
firm-level spending for 1999-2002 from the BLS industry-level growth rates of own-account
software, applied to the 2003 firm-level value of own-account software investment.
Miscellaneous External IT Services
This asset stock is created from the 66% of External IT Services spending that is not
allocated to custom software, which includes activities such as business process consulting and
integration services. This asset stock is treated as uncapitalized. There are no price deflators or
depreciation rates for this capital available from the BLS, thus we use the closest available
substitutes. We use a 37.2% annual rate depreciation, which is the average of R&D and
advertising (following the methodology for firm-specific resources in Corrado, Hulten, and
Sichel 2005, 2009). The price deflator we use is the BEA gross output deflator for NAICS
541512, Computer Systems Design Services. We use a 5-year service life, and impute firm-level
spending for 1999-2002 from the BLS industry-level growth rates of custom software, applied to
the 2003 firm-level value of miscellaneous External IT services spending.
Miscellaneous Internal IT Services: This asset stock is created from the 50% of Internal
IT Services spending that is not allocated to own-account software, which includes activities
such as maintenance and administration. This asset stock is treated as uncapitalized. We use the
same depreciation rate as we do for Miscellaneous External IT Services (37.2%), and also use
the gross output deflator for NAICS 541512. We use a 5-year service life, and impute firm-level
spending for 1999-2002 from the BLS industry-level growth rates of own-account software,
applied to the 2003 firm-level value of miscellaneous Internal IT services spending.
Training: We use the spending reported by the firm for IT-related training and convert it
to an uncapitalized asset stock. We use the same depreciation rate (37.2%) as we do for the other
intangible asset stocks we created (Miscellaneous Internal Services and Miscellaneous External
IT Services), and the same gross output deflator (NAICS 541512) to convert the flows into
constant-dollar measures. We also use a 5-year service life, and impute firm-level spending for
1999-2002 from the BLS industry-level growth rates of custom software, applied to the 2003
firm-level value of IT training.
Research and Development (R&D) Capital
We begin with R&D as reported by the firm (Compustat mnemonic XRD) and apply
BEA price deflators and depreciation rates to create an R&D asset stock. The R&D depreciation
rate for firms in Transportation and Warehousing (NAICS 48-49) is 18%, for Chemicals (NAICS
325) it is 11%, and for all other firms it is 15%." We use a 20-year service life for R&D.
Approximately half the firms in our sample report nonzero values of R&D. Since U.S. firms are
required to report R&D spending if it exceeds 1% of sales (Zhao 2002), we assume zero R&D
spending for firms that do not report R&D. We create a dummy variable equal to one if a firm
does not report R&D and use it in all of our estimating equations. For firms that generally report
R&D, but have some values missing, we impute the missing values by taking the R&D/sales
ratio for the trailing or leading five years and applying it to the sales in the year(s) of missing
R&D. By current accounting practice, no R&D spending is capitalized.
Brand Capital
We start with advertising spending data reported by the firm (Compustat mnemonic
XAD) where possible. Approximately 50 percent of firms in our sample report advertising
" The BEA rate for R&D depreciation in the computers and electronics industry is 16.5%, but we do not use IT-
producing firms in our sample.
expenditures. Advertising costs are typically disclosed in financial reports when material, and so
we are reasonably confident that this covers the firms that spend significant amounts on
advertising. However, for the firms that do not report advertising, we use a database maintained
by Kantar Media called Ad$pender, that reports estimated advertising costs for 95% of firms
covered by Compustat. For the handful of firms (less than 10 in our sample) that we could not
get data from either source, we use industry-level advertising to sales ratios from Schonfeld &
Associates. We construct the asset stock of advertising using a 60% deprecation rate (following
Corrado, Hulten and Sichel 2005, 2009). We use the producer price index (PPI) for advertising
agencies as a price deflator and use an 8-year service life. By current accounting practice,
advertising in not capitalized.
Ordinary Capital
We define ordinary capital as equipment, structures, land and inventories minus
capitalized IT (which is either hardware only, or hardware and software depending on the
estimating equation).12 In Compustat, this is net property, plant and equipment (mnemonic
PPENT) plus inventories (mnemonic INVT), minus our measure of capitalized IT. We
disaggregate the net historical cost, or book value measure of property, plant, and equipment into
current-cost measures of non-IT equipment, structures, and land for each firm. This is a
somewhat involved procedure and is described in further detail in Appendix B. This adjustment
was made in an attempt to keep all assets in the estimating equations in current-cost, rather than
historical-cost values.' 3
12 This is to be consistent with the BLS definition of capital. The BLS has a fifth category, rental residential capital,
which only applies to the Real Estate industry (NAICS 531). Further detail can be found in BLS (1983, Appendix
C).
13 At the end of 2006, the current-cost value of structures held by businesses was $6,910.5 billion, whereas the net
historical cost, or book value of these same structures was $3,522.9 billion. Source: BEA Fixed Assets Table 4.1,
"Current-Cost Net Stock of Private Nonresidential Fixed Assets by Industry Group and Legal Form of
Other Assets
We define other assets as total balance sheet assets (Compustat mnemonic AT) minus net
property, plant and equipment (PPENT) and inventory (INVT). This includes financial assets
such as accounts receivable, cash, other liquid assets, and any other accounting assets intangibles
on the balance sheet.
IT Capabilities (ITC)
The ITC variable is based on Aral and Weill (2007). It is the sum of five components,
which comprise management capability, human resource capability, IT usage in communications
internally and externally, and Internet usage. 4 Each component is constructed from the sum of
several questions on a 1-5 scale that were in the 2005 and 2006 SeeIT surveys." To reduce
measurement error, we average both measures and give each firm a single value for the sample
period. We standardize each of the five component sums to mean 0, variance 1 variables. We
than add those five components, and restandardize that sum to create the mean 0, variance 1
variable we call ITC. We list the components and summary statistics of ITC in Table 5, and the
distribution of ITC (from ITCF through ITCA) in Table 6.
Control Variables
We create sector control variables, and in order to have at least 20 observations for each
sector dummy, we aggregate similar NAICS sectors. We list the sector classifications in Table 7.
Organization," Line 15, and BEA Fixed Assets Table 4.3, "Historical-Cost Net Stock of Private Nonresidential
Fixed Assets by Industry Group and Legal Form of Organization", Line 15.
14 We do not have enough response data to create the sixth component in Aral and Weill (2007), which measures the
degree of digitization in purchase and sales.
15 A much more detailed description of the questions can be found in Aral and Weill (2007).
RESULTS
Our results are as follows: With our 2003-2006 dataset, we are able to recreate the
Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) finding that $1 dollar of computer hardware is correlated
with more than $10 of value. We then account for the "other $9" by broadening the definition of
IT to include software, and then all IT intangible spending. The value of $1 of the broadest
measure of IT is correlated with close to $1, its theoretical value.
However, our results suggest that this value is not spread evenly throughout the sample.
Rather, it is positively correlated with the firms with the highest capabilities (such as the ITC_A
firms) and is negatively correlated with the firms without such capabilities (such as the ITC_F
firms). The difference in market value between these groups is striking: Holding fixed all
physical as well as intangible assets of the firm, we estimate a 30-55% value premium to the
ITCA firms over the ITCF firms. This finding holds up to alternative specifications as well as
several robustness checks. The estimated premium of being an ITCA firm is consistent with the
observation that IT investments are riskier than ordinary investments (Dewan, Shi, and
Gurbaxani, 2003) and thus, the firms that do IT well are rewarded handsomely by the market.
We also estimate $1 of R&D and brand capital is correlated with more than $1 of value,
whereas we do not find the same premiums to physical or financial capital. This further suggests
that intangible assets, rather than physical assets, are what differentiate firms.
Because the market value equations use the replacement cost of computers (the cost to
replace the stock of computers in the dollars of that year), and not historical cost (the cost of the
computers in the year in which they were purchased), the market value of $1 of replacement-cost
computers, in theory, should be no different from year to year. This will allow us to compare our
results directly to Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002). From 1987-2006, the stock of hardware
held by businesses in the United States grew 215%, from $76 billion to more than $161 billion
(Figure 2). However, this barely outpaced the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which grew 175%
during the same period. The story is very different when we take into account the quality
changes to computing: U.S. businesses held 32 times as much computing power at the end of
2006 as they did in 1987.16 However, even though 20 years of technical change have produced
computers of stunningly different quality, the market value of $1 of new 1987 computers in 1987
should be no different than the market value of $1 of new 2006 computers in 2006.
When we examine investments in IT made by businesses in the United States, we find
that the ratio of intangible-IT spending to hardware spending in our sample is similar to that of
the economy as a whole. In our sample, we compute $6.98 in intangible IT for every $1 of
hardware spending from 2003-2006 (Table 2). For the U.S. economy in 2003-2006, for every $1
dollar of hardware investment, businesses spent $6.13 in software, internal IT services and
external IT services (including training). Intangible investments in IT have grown significantly
in the United States from 1990-2006, from $95 billion in 1990 to more than $450 billion in 2006
(shown in Figure 3).17
16 Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Fixed Assets Table 2.2. "Chain-Type Quantity Indexes for Net Stock of
Private Fixed Assets, Equipment and Software, and Structures by Type," Line 5. The value of the quantity index
was 3.507 in 1987, and 113.598 in 2006 (with 2005 as the base year, equal to 100).
17 Source: Hardware and Software (prepackaged, custom, and own-account) investment from BEA NIPA Table
5.3.5, "Private Fixed Investment by Type," Lines 11 and 12. IT services consist of Internal IT services and External
IT services. IT training is included in IT services. Since the BEA allocates 50% of all Internal IT spending for own-
account software, we create a category for Internal IT Services as equal to spending on own-account software.
Spending on External IT services from the Service Annual Survey. From 1998-2006, we use revenue in NAICS
industry 5415 (Computer Systems Design and Related Services) minus 541511 (Custom Computer Programming
Services), since NAICS 541511 is allocated for custom software. For 1990-1997, we use the revenue from SIC
industries 7373, 7376, and 7379 as this most closely matches the industries from NAICS 5415 excluding 541511.
We further adjust the SIC estimates to match the NAICS definitions by multiplying the SIC estimates by the ratio of
the NAICS to SIC revenue in these industries in 1998, the only year in which data in both formats is available. We
begin with 1990, the first year with data available from SIC codes 7373, 7376, and 7379 in the Service Annual
Survey.
In Table 8, we use market value estimation of equation (2) for all three of our measures
of IT, moving from the narrowest measure (purchased hardware) to including all IT-related
intangibles. Column 1 is an attempt to replicate the results from Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang
(2002). We see that one dollar of computer capital, defined as hardware only, is correlated with
about $11 of value, significantly above its theoretical value of $1. In contrast, a dollar of
ordinary capital and other assets are correlated with close to $1. These results are similar to the
results in Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002, p. 160).18 They did not maintain that that hardware
itself is worth more than $10, (and neither do we), but that this hardware is correlated with
unmeasured intangibles. We examine this hypothesis in Columns 3-6.
Although $1 of our broadest measure of IT is correlated with close to $1 of value on
average, our results suggest that high ITC firms account for a disproportionate share of the value
IT-intangibles. In Table 9, Column 3, we estimate that holding all assets fixed, the difference in
value between the ITCA and the ITCF firms is 3,999 - (-4,925) million, or $8.9 billion. We
estimate the difference in value between the ITCF firms and the ITCB firms is about $7.6
billion. The same is true when using capitalized IT in Column 1. These differences are
statistically significant at the 1% level, and are practically significant as well. Since the average
market value of the firms in our sample is $31.1 billion, an $8.9 billion difference is almost a
30% premium in market value for the companies with the highest IT capabilities over the
companies with the lowest IT capabilities.
18 Our results from OLS estimation (not shown here) are also similar to Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) and are
qualitatively similar to our GLS results. One dollar of computer capital is correlated with more than $10 of value,
and a dollar of ordinary capital and other assets are each correlated with close to $1 of value. When we broaden the
definition of IT, we estimate coefficients closer to 1. One dollar of advertising and R&D are associated with
significantly more than $1 of value, and ITC can predict significant differences in market value.
Our results suggest that organizational IT practices are highly complementary to
investments in IT. That is, $1 dollar of IT capital in an ITCA firm is correlated with
significantly higher value than $1 of IT capital in an ITCC or ITCF firm. This is shown in
Table 9, Column 4, with the full set of interaction terms for IT and ITC. For an ITCA firm with
the sample average of the broadest measure of IT assets ($562.9 million), the total estimated
effect of IT on market value is (25.8 1+0.01)* 562.9 - 2,570 million, equal to $12.0 billion.
However, for an ITCF firm with the same amount of IT, the total estimated effect of IT on
market value is (5.55+0.01)*562.9 - 8,300 million, equal to -$5.2 billion. In other words, each
dollar of IT is correlated with negative nine dollars in market value. The difference between
these two groups is $17.2 billion, significant at the 1% level, and very large in a practical sense -
amounting to more than 55% of the average market value of the firms in the sample. The
estimated difference between the top and bottom performers is similarly striking if we use
capitalized IT instead (Column 2).
There isn't just a significant difference in value that can be explained by the extreme ends
of the distribution of ITC. We also estimate significant differences in value between the average
(ITCC) firms and the ITCA and ITCF firms. In Table 9, Column 4, $562.9 million of the
broadest measure of IT in the ITCC firms is estimated to be valued at 0.01*562.9, or $5.6
million, and this is not statistically different from 0. However, this is $5.2 billion more than that
ITCF firms, and $12.0 billion less than the ITCA firms. Both of these differences are
statistically significant at the 1% level.
In the analyses in Tables 8 and 9, we reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of
R&D and brand are equal to 1 against the alternative that they are greater than 1 at the 5% level
of significance. We were surprised by the large value for brand, and upon further analysis, found
a single, large consumer products company drove a substantial part of this value. If we drop this
company from the sample and rerun the analyses in Tables 8 and 9 (not shown), we find that the
coefficients of the other variables remain virtually unchanged but the coefficient for brand drops
to below 5 in Table 8, and is approximately 3 in Table 9. This suggests that when it comes to
brand, certain industries (such as consumer products) are disproportionately important. This
observation fits with our findings that most of the IT-intangibles appear to be concentrated in a
small number of firms. The same is likely true for R&D and brand.
It is unlikely that measurement error is responsible for our results. If anything,
measurement error in the IT hardware, R&D, or brand variables would strengthen our
conclusions, as measurement error in these variables would bias the coefficients downwards
(Griliches and Hausman, 1986). Measurement error would also not explain why our ITC
variable works in order in explaining differences in market value. We also reran all
specifications without advertising and R&D altogether, and all the same results for IT hold. We
further examine whether our results hold if we drop values from 2003 and 2004. The 2003 and
2004 IT asset stocks rely more on imputation than the 2005 and 2006 values of IT (because our
IT spending data runs from 2003-2006). As well, since our organizational IT and management
practice data was measured in 2005 and 2006, by dropping 2003 and 2004 we can examine
whether our assumption that ITC is quasi-fixed and thus applicable to 2003 and 2004 is
acceptable. Our main results still hold based only on 2005 and 2006 values for each firm.
CONCLUSION
Using a panel of 130 firms over the period 2003-2006, our study is the first to create
comprehensive asset stocks based on IT-related intangible spending at the firm level. We build
upon the framework by Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) who found that $1 of computer
hardware was correlated more than $10 of market value, and that this value was accounted for by
a set of complementary human resource practices. With our expanded definition of IT, that
includes both purchased and internally developed software, internal IT services, external IT
services, and IT-related training, we estimate these values - the "other $9" - directly in a market
value equation.
Our results suggest that IT is not a "rising tide that lifts all boats." By using survey data
that takes account of management and organizational IT capabilities (e.g., HR practices,
management practices, internal IT use, external IT use, and Internet use), we find that these
capabilities can help account for the value of IT intangibles. Firms with the highest IT
capabilities (ITC) are correlated with significantly higher market value that the firms with the
lowest IT capabilities. Holding fixed all tangible and intangible assets of the firm, we estimate
that the firms in the highest ITC group have 30-55% greater market value than the firms in the
lowest ITC group. We actually estimate that for every $1 of our broadest measure of IT, firms in
the lowest ITC group realize a loss of $9 of market value.
Our study also uses market valuation techniques to value research and development
(R&D) and brand as part of a broader effort to examine the value of intangible assets in the firm.
Based on our results that R&D and brand are correlated with significantly higher market value,
further research is warranted on which industries and firms drive most of this value. The results
suggest that what will differentiate firms in the 21st century will be how they manage their
intangible assets.
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Table 1. Variable Means for Sample, 2003-2006 ($Millions)
Mean Std. Minimum Maximum*
Deviation
1. Market Value 31,095.0 59,672.7 295.7 353,935.7
2. IT Capital - purchased hardware 45.0 88.4 0.2 493.0
3. IT Capital - capitalized hardware and 202.9 354.6 1.4 1,869.0
software
4. IT Capital - all capitalized and uncapitalized 562.9 1,080.8 4.6 6,285.3
hardware, software, plus services, training,
and leases converted to asset stocks.
5. Ordinary Capital (when IT defined as line 9,511.2 18,769.3 3.9 110,629.6
3 or line 4)
6. Other Assets 11,617.9 35,193.2 26.4 229,411.8
7. R&D Capital 2,529.2 7,495.2 0 44,004.9
8. Brand Capital 337.1 946.4 0 5,891.8
*To avoid disclosure, we list the maximum as the average of the 10 largest observations.
Table 2. Average IT Spending per Firm, 2003-2006 ($Millions)
Mean Standard Minimum Maximum*
Deviation
1. Hardware 32.4 61.9 0.2 343.5
2. Prepackaged Software 37.1 66.9 0.3 370.2
3. External IT Services 47.0 89.5 0.3 503.5
(e.g., custom software, business process
consulting, integration services)
4. Internal IT Services 129.2 236.6 0.9 1,337.5
(e.g., own-account software, design,
maintenance, administration)
5. IT-related Training 12.8 23.6 0.03 131.1
Total IT Spending 258.5 469.3 1.9 2,627.7
*To avoid disclosure, we list the maximum as the average of the 10 largest observations.
Table 3. Capitalization Ratios of Hardware and Software Spending for 2003-2006 Sample
Spending Type Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
1. Hardware purchases and leases 100.0% --- --- ---
2. Purchases, capitalized 64.0% 10.0% 51.2% 84.7%
3. Purchases, not capitalized 18.2% 6.2% 5.4% 30.0%
4. Leases, not capitalized 17.8% 5.2% 5.4% 26.0%
5. Software purchases, payroll, and 100.0% --- --- ---
licensing
6. Purchases and payroll, capitalized 53.1% 8.7% 26.5% 68.7%
7. Purchases and payroll, not 24.9% 8.1% 12.0% 56.8%
capitalized
8. Leases, not capitalized 22.0% 3.9% 11.6% 34.9%
Table 4. Average IT Stocks by Firm for 2003-2006 Sample ($millions)
Average
Annual Price
Avg. Changefor
Not Depreciation new
Asset Capitalized Capitalized Total Rate Investment
1. Hardware 34.2 21.5 55.7 30.8% -13.2%
2. Prepackaged Software 28.8 27.2 56.0 40.6% -4.3%
3. Custom Software 28.6 16.5 45.1 28.2% 1.2%
4. Own-Account Software 111.3 63.1 174.4 27.2% 1.2%
5. External IT Services 0 69.0 69.0 37.2% 1.0%
(other than software
design, e.g., business
process consulting,
integration services)
6. Internal IT Services 0 135.0 135.0 37.2% 1.0%
(other than software
design, e.g. maintenance
and administration)
7. Training 0 27.8 27.8 37.2% 1.0%
Total 202.9 360.0 562.9
Table 5. Components of IT Capabilities (ITC)
ITC is the standardized sum (mean 0, standard deviation 1) of the five factors below.
Please rate whether the following factors at your company facilitate or inhibit the ability to make new information technology investments on a
scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being "inhibits significantly," 3 being "no effect," and 5 being "facilitates significantly."
HR Capabilities Average Std. Dev.
Technical skills of existing IT staff 4.57 0.50
Business skills of existing IT staff 4.53 0.50
Ability to hire competent IT staff 2.53 1.18
Skills of end-users 3.55 0.57
Management Capability
Business Unit involvement in IT projects 2.60 1.14
Senior Management Support 2.56 1.16
Please rate how important the following methods are for (internal communications, communications with suppliers) in your company on a scale
from 1 to 5, with 1 being "not at all important," 3 being "moderately important," and 5 being "extremely important."
Internal IT Use
Email 4.53 0.50
Mobile Electronic Mail (e.g., BlackBerry) 4.48 0.50
Instant Messaging 3.63 0.59
Company Intranet 3.55 0.55
Wireless (including phone and pager) 4.44 0.50
Supplier IT Use
Email 4.54 0.50
Mobile Electronic Mail (e.g., BlackBerry) 4.56 0.50
Instant Messaging 3.50 0.50
Internet 3.60 0.49
Wireless (including phone and pager) 4.44 0.50
Please identify to what extent your company uses Internet technology to perform each of the tasks on a scale from 1 (no use of the Internet) to
5 (fully automated via the Internet).
Internet Capability
Sales force management 4.54 0.50
Employee performance measurement 3.10 0.89
Training 3.11 0.84
Post-sales customer support 3.00 0.86
Table 6. Distribution of Capabilities (ITC)
Category Meaning Number of
Observations
ITCA ITC > 1.5 20
ITCB 0.5 < ITC <= 1.5 152
ITCC -0.5 < ITC <=0.5 196
ITCD -1.5 < ITC <= -0.5 108
ITCF ITC < -1.5 44
Total 520
Table 7. Sector Dummy Variables
NAICS Codes
11, 22, 21, 23
322,324,325
Observations
36
104
311-316, 323, 326
Sector Dummy Variables
1. Agriculture, Mining, Utilities Construction
2. Nondurable Process Manufacturing:
Paper products; Petroleum and Coal products; Chemical products
3. Other Nondurable Manufacturing:
Food, Beverage and Tobacco products; Textile Mills and Textile
Product Mills; Apparel and Leather and Allied products; Printing and
related support activities; Plastics and Rubber products
4. Durable Manufacturing, High-Tech:
Computer and electronic products, Electrical equipment, appliances and
components; Motor Vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts; and Other
transportation equipment
5. Durable Manufacturing, non High-Tech:
Wood products; Nonmetallic Mineral products; Primary Metals;
Fabricated Metal products; Machinery; Furniture and related
products; Miscellaneous manufacturing
6. Wholesale and Retail Trade
7. Transportation and Warehousing
8. Information
9. Finance and Insurance (companies excluded, no observations)
10. Real Estate and Rental and Leasing, Professional, Scientific and Legal
Services; Management of Companies and Enterprises; Administrative
and Support services, Waste Management and Remediation Services
11. Educational Services; Health Care and Social Assistance
12. Arts, Entertainment and Recreation; Accommodation and Food
Services; Other Services except Government
321, 327, 331, 332,
333, 337, 339
44-45
48-49
51
52
53, 54, 55, 56
61, 62
71, 72, 81
Total 520
334, 335, 336
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Figure 2. Computer Hardware Owned by Businesses in the United States,
1987-2006. Source, BEA Fixed Assets Table 2.1, "Current-Cost Net Stock
of Private Fixed Assets, Equipment and Software, and Structures by Type,"
Line 5.
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Figure 3. IT Spending by Businesses in the United States, 1990-2006.
Sources: BEA NIPA Table 5.3.5, "Private Fixed Investment by Type," and
authors' calculations from the Census Bureau's Service Annual Survey.
Table 8. Financial Value as a Function of the Assets of the Firm, 2003-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Information Technology (IT) = Hardware 11.46 10.97
(3.08) (3.28)
Information Technology (IT) = Hardware, 4.59 3.41
Capitalized Software (1.05) (0.94)
Information Technology (IT) = Hardware, 1.16 0.89
Capitalized Software, Other Intangibles (0.33) (0.29)
Ordinary Capital (K) 1.02 0.87 1.01 0.86 1.03 0.87
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Other Assets (F) 1.14 1.03 1.15 1.04 1.14 1.03
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
R&D (R) 1.43 1.46 1.44
(0.27) (0.26) (0.27)
Brand (B) 7.87 8.01 7.92
(1.58) (1.55) (1.58)
Number of Observations 520 520 520 520 520 520
Note: All regressions are GLS, with correction for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Sector and year
dummies are included, as well as dummies for no R&D and whether advertising was imputed.
Table 9. Financial Value as a Function of the Assets of the Firm and ITC, 2003-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Information Technology (/T) = Hardware,
Capitalized Software
Information Technology (IT) = Hardware,
Capitalized Software, Other Intangibles
Ordinary Capital (K)
Other Assets (F)
R&D (R)
Brand (B)
ITC > 1.5
(ITCA = 1)
0.5 < ITC < 1.5
(ITC_B = 1)
-1.5 < ITC < -0.5
(ITCD = 1)
ITC < -1.5
(ITCF = 1)
IT*ITCA
IT*ITCB
IT*ITC_D
IT*ITC_F
Number of Observations
2.84
(0.94)
0.94
(0.07)
0.99
(0.06)
1.77
(0.29)
5.97
(1.64)
3,951
(2,304)
2,372
(790)
-1,281
(901)
-5,066
(2,022)
520
-0.61
(2.02)
0.89
(0.06)
1.01
(0.06)
1.44
(0.27)
6.97
(1.64)
-2,832
(1,731)
-1,063
(919)
-2,451
(959)
-8,488
(2,304)
71.02
(18.45)
15.97
(3.69)
3.43
(2.29)
14.94
(8.08)
520
0.74
(0.27)
0.93
(0.06)
1.00
(0.06)
1.79
(0.28)
6.14
(1.61)
3,999
(2,257)
2,651
(761)
-1,273
(868)
-4,925
(1,976)
520
0.01
(0.70)
0.90
(0.06)
1.02
(0.06)
1.47
(0.27)
6.68
(1.63)
-2,570
(1,752)
-652
(922)
-2,129
(952)
-8,300
(2,333)
25.81
(6.90)
5.50
(1.36)
0.76
(0.76)
5.55
(3.24)
520
Note: All regressions are GLS, with correction for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Sector and
year dummies are included, as well as dummies for no R&D and whether advertising was imputed.
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APPENDIX B. CALCULATION OF ORDINARY CAPITAL
We define physical capital as the sum of equipment, structures, land, and inventories,
according to the BLS definition of capital. Ordinary, or Non-IT capital, is thus sum of four types
of capital: Non-IT equipment, structures, land, and inventories.
Inventories
We take the value directly from the Compustat (mnemonic INVT). We do not transform
this variable, and assume it is a reasonable estimate for the current-cost wealth stock.
Structures and Land
We begin with PPENT, Compustat's mnemonic for the net book value of property, plant,
and equipment. This consists of equipment, structures, and land. However, there is no further
classification of the capital stock by type because publicly traded companies are not required to
disaggregate their capital stock in their filings. Thus, we disaggregate the firm's capital stock
assuming the industry mix of equipment, structures, and land. There are two complications,
however. The first is that the BEA, which publishes historical cost stocks and current dollar
stocks of capital at the industry level, does not include land in its estimates. The second is that
the BLS, which publishes current-cost industry-level capital stocks that include land, does not
publish historical-cost estimates. Thus, we combine both data sources to compute a historical to
current cost ratio of equipment, structures, and land by industry, which can then be applied
against the firm-level net historical-cost stocks of capital.
We begin by converting the BLS industry data from constant dollar productive stocks to
current-dollar productive stocks using BLS Tables 4a and 8b. We then use BEA Fixed Assets
Tables 3.3E and 3.3S respectively to convert equipment and structures from current-cost to
historical-cost dollars. We then impute the historical-cost value of land by using the BLS
current-cost estimate of land times the BEA ratio of historical to current cost for structures for
that industry. (We assume that the ratio of historical-cost estimate to current-cost estimate of
land is the same as that for structures.)
We use our historical-cost estimates for each industry to match against Compustat's
PPENT field, a firm-level historical-cost net stock of equipment, structures, and land. We
estimate firm-level equipment by multiplying PPENT by the industry average ratio of equipment
to the total of equipment, structures, and land. We illustrate in equation (B. 1):
E 7histE histEh-' =PPENT- indu (B.1)firm Ehist + (1hist)+L'Eindu _r0indu i ndu
Where E hi't is net equipment at the firm level in historical-cost dollars. E hi is
aggregate equipment at the industry level, in historical cost dollars, from BEA Table 3.3E. Sht
is the historical-cost stock of structures for the industry, from BEA Table 3.3S. L "' is the
historical cost of land, which we imputed as described above.
To convert E hist to a current-dollar estimate, we multiply it by the industry ratio offirm
equipment in current cost dollars to historical cost dollars.
Ecur = E hist , ndu (B.2)fi"" E hist
indu
Where Ecjr is the aggregate of equipment by industry in current costs, from BEA Fixed
Assets Table 3.1 E. We do the same thing for structures. For land, since the BEA does not
publish historical or current cost estimates of land by industry in the Fixed Assets tables, we use
the same historical to current ratio as structures:
Sr
L = L'st S"d" (B.3)firm s hist
indu
For two industry pairs, we make slight adjustments because the BLS aggregates BEA
codes 336M and 3360 together into one industry code, and also aggregates BEA codes 622H
and 6230 into one industry code. The BEA publishes current-cost and historical-cost industry
data for each of these BEA-codes separately. Therefore, we allocated land for the 336M + 3360
pair into each of their components 336M, and 3360, by the ratio of the BEA estimates of
structures for the industry (336M) to the BLS estimate of structures for the pair (336M +
3360)."9
Non-IT Equipment
We estimate current-cost non-IT equipment from estimate of equipment at the firm level
minus our measure for IT (whether it is hardware only, or capitalized IT). We drop observations
in which our estimate for non-IT equipment is 0, as our IT estimate has a potentially serious
measurement issue, or the firm uses a very different mix of equipment, structures and land from
the rest of the industry. This affects only a small handful of firms in our sample, however.
19 Both the BEA and BLS have publicly available industry-level estimates of equipment and structures for each
industry. Because they make different assumptions about deprecation, the estimates are close, but not the same
(usually they are within 10% of each other).
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Chapter 2
Has Information Technology Leveled
the Competitive Playing Field?
Adam Saunders
MIT Sloan School of Management
February 2009
This paper analyzes the relationship between IT and ordinary (non-IT)
capital and the competitive dynamics within U.S. industries. Using a
panel of industry data from 1998-2005, I investigate whether IT has
leveled the competitive playing field between small and large firms. I
address three questions: (1) Is IT affecting barriers to entry? (2) What is
the relationship between IT capital and the rate of turnover among small
firms in an industry? (3) Is more IT associated with industries becoming
more concentrated in smaller or larger firms? As to whether IT levels
the competitive playing field, my results are mixed. When an industry
becomes more IT intensive, there is more entry and expansion of firms
(including entry of new small firms and expansion of large firms from
the same and other industries). Yet there is also more turnover of small
firms in the industry as well as concentration of the industry into large
firms. In contrast, as an industry becomes more ordinary capital-
intensive, there is less entry of small firms and fewer establishment
openings by large firms; a lower rate of turnover by small firms; and
fragmentation of the industry into small firms. My results further
suggest that in IT intensive environments, large firms use business
process replication to expand their share of the market, and in less IT
intensive environments, small firms may be operating in more niche
markets, thus avoiding direct competition with larger firms. This paper
contributes to existing literature on IT and the boundaries of the firm.
I thank Daniel Berch, Erik Brynjolfsson, Chris Forman, Avi Goldfarb, Bin Gu, Lorin Hitt, Yu (Jeffrey) Hu,
Heekyung Hellen Kim, Stu Madnick, Tom Malone, Andrew McAfee, Yiftach Nagar, Eric Overby, Galit Sarfaty,
James Short, George Westerman, Stephanie Woemer, D.J. Wu, Lynn Wu, Michael Zhang, and the participants of
the 2008 Workshop on Information Systems and Economics for their suggestions and guidance. All errors are, of
course, my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Information technology (IT) enables small businesses to easily connect with suppliers
and customers across the United States and around the world. Moreover, high-tech startups that
originate in garages, basements, or college dorm rooms use IT to compete with the mightiest of
companies in ways that would have been impossible 50 years ago. Anyone with a web
connection has the potential to reach millions. Yet has IT really leveled the competitive playing
field between small and large firms in the U.S. economy?
In this paper, I investigate the following questions: (1) Does more capital per firm in an
industry serve as a barrier to entry, as previous theory would indicate, or is IT a unique kind of
capital that affects barriers to entry? (2) Has IT increased the rate of turnover among small firms
in the industry? (3) Is IT associated with fragmentation of the industry into small firms, or
concentration into large firms?
In order to answer these questions, I begin by analyzing the relationship between IT and
ordinary (non-IT) capital per employee in an industry and the total number of small entrants and
large firm expansions in that industry. I examine whether, as an industry becomes more IT-
intensive, more establishment openings are by small firms (with less 20 employees) or by large
firms (with 500 or more employees). I then investigate the relationship between capital and both
firm turnover and industry concentration. I conduct this study based on industry-level data from
the U.S. Census Bureau, the Small Business Administration, and the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. My results are based on fixed effects specifications on a panel of 53 industries in the
United States during the period from 1998 to 2005.1
1 These are industries that do not produce IT. Further details of industry classification are provided in Section 3
(Data) and Appendix B.
As to whether IT levels the competitive playing field between small and large firms, my
results suggest a mixed picture. When an industry becomes more IT intensive, I find that there is
more entry and expansion of firms (including entry of new small firms and expansion of large
firms from the same and other industries), but there is also more turnover of small firms in the
industry as well as concentration of the industry into large firms. I further elaborate on these
points below.
My results indicate that IT capital affects barriers to entry for small and large firms. As
an industry becomes more IT capital-intensive, there are more small entrants as well as more
establishment openings by large firms. This dynamic stands in contrast to my finding that as an
industry becomes more capital intensive (as defined by IT plus ordinary capital per firm), there
are fewer small entrants and less establishment openings by large firms. Likewise, increases in
ordinary capital in an industry are also associated with reduced small firm entry and less
expansion by large firms.
Comparing the source of establishment openings in an industry, I find that more IT
capital per firm is strongly associated with greater large firm expansion relative to small firm
entry. Establishment openings by large firms come from (1) firms already in the industry that
add another establishment; and (2) firms in other industries that open an establishment in a
different industry for the first time.
How does the entrance and expansion of large firms in IT-intensive industries affect the
small firms? I find that as an industry becomes more IT intensive, there is more turnover among
small firms.2 In contrast, as an industry becomes more ordinary capital-intensive, there is less
2 My measure of turnover is establishment births plus deaths throughout the year divided by the number of
establishments at the beginning of the year.
turnover among small firms. For large firms, increases in capital intensity - whether it be IT or
ordinary capital - does not change establishment turnover to a significant extent.
Lastly, I find that as an industry becomes more IT intensive, small firms make up a
smaller percentage of the industry's total firms. In other words, there is more concentration of
the industry into large firms. This means that small firms are entering more IT intensive
industries despite the fact that there is greater turnover among small firms and that large firms
expand to take up a greater share of the industry. That is, small firms are entering industries that
become more IT intensive even though conditions do not appear to favor small firm survival. In
contrast, although an increase in ordinary capital in an industry is associated with less firm entry,
it is also strongly associated with industry fragmentation into small firms.
Examining the relationship between IT capital and the competitive dynamics within
industries has important implications for entrepreneurs and policymakers. For entrepreneurs, the
relationship between IT, entry, and turnover can help guide investment decisions about whether
to enter low-tech or high-tech industries. For policymakers, this study provides insights as to
whether tax breaks or other incentives should be directed towards small or large firms,
depending on whether the industry is becoming more technology-intensive or ordinary capital-
intensive.
My paper contributes to literature on IT and firm boundaries. Much of the existing
scholarship has focused on the role of IT in the context of large firms. There are a number of
scholars that have studied the ways in which firms have transformed their businesses through
technology-enabled organizational change. 3 Yet the literature that examines IT and small
3 See Brynjolfsson, Renshaw and Van Alstyne (1997) for a case study of IT-led process change in a large
manufacturing company. Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2002) use a dataset of large firms to measure the value of IT
in combination with high-performance workplace practices, and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002)
demonstrate that IT and workplace practices are associated with higher productivity. Further examples and case
business competitiveness is much less developed. In a literature review covering the 1986-1999
period, Burgess (2002, p.2) notes that the number of peer-reviewed articles that relate to IT and
small firms constitute between just two-thirds of one percent to one percent of all peer reviewed
articles about IT. Applying his methodology, I find little change in more recent years, with
about one percent of scholarly articles from 2000-2007 relating to IT also relating to small firms.
I argue that this understudied area is worthy of further research given that most firms in the
economy are small-according to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were almost six million firms in
the United States in 2005, and nine out of every ten of them employed less than 20 people.4
Analyzing the dynamics of small firms within IT-intensive industries has implications for
the theory of the firm and, more specifically, how information technology is associated with
changes to the boundaries of the firm. Coase (1937) was the first to consider the boundaries of
the firm by exploring why transactions would be done inside a firm or by the market. Since
Coase published his seminal work, there have been other scholars who have further explored
firm boundaries.5 Some topics they have been covered include transaction costs (Williamson
1981), property rights (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990), information uncertainty
(Arrow 1974), and contingencies (Thompson 1967). Scholars have demonstrated that firms can
provide the right incentives for employees to invest in specific skills or information. My paper
contributes to this literature by examining whether IT is a unique kind of capital that allows
studies can be found in Autor, Levy and Murnane (2002) and Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw (2007). For a recent
review of the literature in this area, see Saunders and Brynjolfsson (2007).
4 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics of U.S. Businesses 2005. Available at
http://www.census.gov/epcd/susb/2005/us/US--.HTM
5 A full examination of theories of the firm is well beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader is advised
to consult Gibbons (2005).
firms to enter industries and better coordinate activities among their establishments. It also
considers whether information technology is associated with industry fragmentation into small
firms, in which case markets would coordinate what was once done inside firms.
My paper addresses the large literature about the dynamics of competition among firms
(Dierickx and Cool 1989; Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984; Kogut and Zander 1992; Nelson and
Winter 1982; Porter 1980; Schumpeter 1942; Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997; Winter and
Szulanski 2001; Zander and Kogut 1995). I contribute to the debate between IT, competition,
and firm size. Leavitt and Whisler's 1958 Harvard Business Review article, one of the first to
coin the term "information technology," predicted that IT would make the firm larger. Wilson
(1975) argued that better information would lead to a larger scale of operations, which would
then encourage the firm to acquire even better information, and so forth. In this model, the costs
of gathering information declines with scale, whereas the value of information does not (p. 189).
Taken to the extreme, this virtuous cycle could continue without bound.6
On the other hand, the seminal work by Malone, Yates and Benjamin (1987, p.496)
predicted "information technology will lead to an overall shift toward proportionately more use
of markets rather than hierarchies to coordinate economic activity." This is because IT lowers
coordination costs, such as scheduling, tracking financial flows, or negotiating contracts. This
would mean that IT should be associated with smaller firms.
An empirical study by Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil (1994) confirmed
this prediction and they conclude that IT is associated with smaller firms, based on data from
1976 through 1987. Another study by Brynjolfsson, McAfee, Sorell and Zhu (2007) examines
the dynamics of competition in the U.S. economy with respect to more IT intensive versus less
6 Unbounded growth occurs assuming constant returns to scale in the production function. Wilson (1975) notes that
of course, there will be eventually decreasing returns to scale which limits infinite growth.
IT intensive industries. It concludes that between 1987 and 2004, firms in IT intensive industries
changed sales ranks more than the firms in less IT intensive industries. The change in sales rank
measure is referred to as "industry turbulence." In a comparison between the pre-1996 and post-
1996 periods, the authors determine that an industry's IT intensity was significant in explaining
the increases in industry turbulence and the concentration in sales and enterprise value between
the two time periods (p. 19). My study contributes to this literature by examining establishment
turnover of small and large firms in relationship to IT intensity. This measure is complementary
to turbulence-industry turnover is one indication of the "creative destruction" (Schumpeter
1942) at work in an industry and complements my analysis of entry by focusing on existing
firms.7 By showing that small firms are subject to greater turnover as an industry becomes more
IT-intensive, my study extends the findings by Brynjolfsson, McAfee, Sorell and Zhu (2007) that
larger firms are subject to greater turbulence in IT-intensive industries.
What is missing from existing studies and what my paper provides is an examination of
the relationship between IT and the dynamics of entry by both small and large firms based on
recent industry-level data. My paper contributes to existing literature both in terms of its quality
of data and the questions that it addresses. I use fixed effects estimation to examine changes
within multiple industries from 1998-2005. My work examines the IT and firm size question
first posed empirically by Brynj olfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil (1994) but relies on
more recent data that is more fine-grained, based on more industries and several size categories.
It also supplements the work of Brynjolfsson, McAfee, Sorell and Zhu (2007) by going beyond
the large firms in Compustat that they rely on and also examining small firms.
7 Since I use industry-level data, I do not have access to the sales ranks of individual firms and thus cannot measure
industry turbulence.
Using this extensive data about establishment dynamics and firm size, my paper is the
first to examine the association between IT and small firm entry into industries. My results
contrast with Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil (1994) as I find that increased IT per
firm is associated with fewer small firms and more large firms. By using Census data that is not
restricted to a single industry for a given firm, I can ask previously unexamined questions such
as whether large firms are branching out into new industries. As a result, I am able to analyze
whether entry into IT-intensive industries is by new small firms, or large firms that are opening
new establishments, or both.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
To determine how capital intensity affects the dynamics of firms in an industry, consider
the typical firm's cost function as the sum of fixed costs and variable costs:
C = F + c(x) (1)
Where C is the firm's total costs, F is the firm's fixed costs, and c(x) is the cost of output as a
function of x, thereby making c'(x) equal to the marginal costs of production. Let
c(x) = rK + wL, where rK represents the cost of capital as rental price r times the stock of
capital K. Let wL represent the cost of labor as the wage rate w times the number of employees
L.
Barriers to Entry
My paper explores whether capital (including ordinary and IT capital) serves as a barrier
to entry. In a dynamic economy, K should behave as more of a fixed cost than L. So as K
increases with respect to L, then it is reasonable to expect that F would increase relative to c(x).
There are several reasons why capital intensity may serve as a barrier to entry, especially
for small firms.8 Below I list five reasons cited by Tirole (1988, p. 3 14-15 citing Bain 1956),
including one that uses the Stackelberg-Spence-Dixit model of capital as a commitment device.
1) Financing. All else being equal, if an industry's production process tends to be very
capital intensive, then small firms would likely find entry difficult because they need to raise
more money to enter the market. It is going to be a lot easier to raise money to open a dry
cleaning store than it is to start an oil refinery. Large incumbents will likely have a greater
advantage in securing capital than relatively unproven entrants.
2) Economies ofScale. If c"(x) < 0 , then there are economies of scale present in the
production process. Naturally, this would favor large firm expansion.9
3) Lower Marginal Costs. As compared to new small firms, existing firms with large
capital stocks may have lower marginal costs c'(x), through learning by doing, research and
development, or more favorable terms with suppliers. For example, the largest employer in the
United States, Wal-Mart, uses its size as bargaining power to negotiate better terms with its
suppliers, and thus offer lower prices than its competitors.
4) Product-Differentiation Technologies. Large firms may crowd the product space with
niche products, thus making it difficult for small firms to enter an industry. For example, the
Swedish Tobacco company, upon losing its government-protected monopoly status, doubled the
number of brands it offered (Tirole 1998, p.346). Citing Schmalensee (1978), Tirole notes that
"the six leading manufacturers of ready-to-eat breakfast cereals introduced eighty brands
8 In 2004 (the year with the most recent data available), more than 4 out of every 5 establishment births in the United
States represented new firms with less than 20 employees. The remainder of establishment births came mainly from
expansions by firms with more than 500 employees. See Table 3 for details.
9 In the case of a multi-product firm, economies of scope would favor expansion of the firm into other industries.
between 1950 and 1972 (the year in which the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint
against the four largest manufacturers), who had cornered 85 percent of the market and who
enjoyed large profits."
5) Commitment Device. According to the Stackelberg-Spence-Dixit model, a large,
illiquid capital stock could serve as a commitment device for an incumbent firm by signaling to
potential entrants that entry would be unprofitable. The incumbent is, in effect, burning its
bridges'0 and committing to remain in the market whether or not entry occurs, which might make
potentially profitable entry unprofitable and deter entry altogether (ibid, p.3 14-315).
IT as a Unique Type of Capital
While capital may pose a barrier to entry for the reasons cited above, it is necessary to
recognize that different types of capital will affect firm dynamics in different ways. IT is a
unique kind of capital that allows for significantly greater coordinating activities within firms
and better communication between firms (Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil, 1994).
In this vein, I argue that it is important to consider IT and ordinary capital separately when
considering F and c(x).
IT capital can enable small firms to be on more favorable competitive terms with respect
to larger firms. For example, with better communication and coordination, a firm could
theoretically be located anywhere. Consider a firm that opens in New Jersey instead of New
York City and, as a result, pays lower real estate costs. IT also allows for other costs to be
outsourced, such as human resources or other administrative activities. By enabling better
10 Dixit and Nalebuff (1991, p. 169) note that this strategy dates back to at least 1066 when William the Conqueror
ordered his invading armies to burn their ships. This committed the armies to fight to win, as retreat was no longer
an option.
communication between firms, small firms could significantly lower F and enter markets that
otherwise would be too unprofitable to enter."
However, it is important to realize that large firms also benefit from better internal
coordination afforded by IT, potentially more so than small firms.' 2 This would enable large
firms to grow even larger and achieve greater economies of scale and scope. A firm can
coordinate activities and create synergies that would not be possible without IT. For example, it
can use IT to extend its particular business model to branch out and open establishments in
several different industries. In this case, the large firm leverages IT to extend its business model,
and the specific industry where it does so is of secondary concern."
Thus, as an industry becomes more IT capital-intensive, there are multiple sources of
entry: from smaller firms that reduce their fixed costs to compete with larger firms, or from large
firms that utilize economies of scope to extend their business model into other industries.' 4 My
econometric model, described in Section 4, addresses this issue. I examine the rate of small
entry and large expansion per 100 establishment openings in an industry, which allows for a
direct comparison of the sources of establishment growth.' 5
" Large firms also benefit from lower external communication costs, although I argue that lower communication
costs will benefit small firms more.
12 While small firms also benefit from better internal coordination, most small firms are single-establishment
locations in which face-to-face communication with everyone else is possible.
13 See Weill et al (2005) for their classification system of the economy into 16 basic business models as an
alternative to the traditional industry classification system.
14 In addition, a large firm already in the industry that opens more establishments in new locations could be
considered entry into different geographic markets, for example.
15 More than 94% of establishment openings in 2004 in the United States were either small firms opening their first
establishment, or large firms opening a secondary establishment.
DATA
Using publicly available data, I create a panel dataset at the industry level from 1998-
2005. I begin with the 63 industries that the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) uses to report
industry-level data in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).16 I then condense
these to 56 industries due to differences in industry aggregation between various government
sources.17 I further narrow the sample to 53 IT-using (or non-IT producing) industries by
dropping Computer and Electronic Products (NAICS 334), Information (NAICS 51),18 and
Computer Design and Related Services (5415), for a total of 371 industry-year observations.19
The remaining industries are at the 2 or 3 digit NAICS level.
For each measure below, I use the following data sources. Further information and the
links to download this data are contained in Appendix B.
Firm and Establishment Births and Deaths
I use data from the Small Business Administration (SBA), Office of Advocacy,
"Statistics of U.S. Businesses and Nonemployer Statistics." The SBA compiles this data from
the Census Bureau's Statistics of U.S. Businesses, "Number of Firms, Number of
Establishments, Employment, and Annual Payroll by Employment Size of the Enterprise for the
United States, All Industries." The number of firms and establishments are reported on March
12th of each year. Establishments are classified in a unique industry according to the majority of
16 This is based on the 1997 NAICS categories.
17 I further describe this process in Appendix B.
18 Ideally, I would drop just the IT-producing industries of Software Publishers (NAICS 5114) and Information and
Data Processing Services (NAICS 514) instead of the entire Information sector (NAICS 51) (which includes those
industries plus others). But in 2003, detailed Information industries (at the 3 digit NAICS level) were completely
reclassified within the NAICS system, making it impossible to match the public data before and after the change.
Therefore, I aggregated the industries to the 2-digit sector level (NAICS 51), which could be smoothly matched
across all the years in the sample.
19 As I detail below, because I match stock to flow data, I lose one year so that I have seven matched years worth of
data.
that establishment's activities. Thus, each establishment appears only once in the industry-level
data. However, a firm is counted as being in an industry if it has at least one establishment in
that industry. Therefore, a multi-unit firm can appear in several industries, a fact that I exploit in
my interpretation of the results.2 0
Capital Stocks
This data comes from the BEA Detailed Fixed Assets Tables. The two tables are called
"Current-Cost Net Capital Stock of Private Nonresidential Fixed Assets" and "Chain-Type
Quantity Indexes for Net Capital Stock of Private Nonresidential Fixed Assets." For IT
equipment, I combine three categories: 1) Computers and Peripherals, 2) Software, and 3)
Communications Equipment. I then deflate IT and ordinary capital into constant 2000 dollars
through a procedure that I describe in Appendix B.
Industry-Level Employment
Data on this measure comes from BEA NIPA Table 6.5D, "Full-Time Equivalent
Employees by Industry." It is defined as the number of full-time employees in the industry, plus
the number of part-time employees (that are converted to a full-time basis).
Data Matching
When assembling the dataset, I matched flow data to stock data in the following way.
Industry-level employment is reported on a calendar-year basis. Capital stock data is reported as
20 For example, consider Microsoft, which employs approximately 55,000 people in the United States. Suppose that
hypothetically, all of the employees work in the software publishing industry. Then suppose that the firm opens a
stand-alone restaurant in downtown Seattle using 10 of its employees. According to the firm count data, the
company would appear once in the software industry and once in the food services industry, each time as a firm with
more than 500 employees that has operations in that industry (because the size of the entire firm is considered in the
firm size classifications). In other words, in the restaurant industry, Microsoft's restaurant would appear as one
establishment with 10 people, belonging to a firm with 500 or more employees. I should note that in this
hypothetical example, it matters where the restaurant is located and whether it is considered to be a separate
establishment. If it were part of an establishment on the Microsoft campus, then it would not appear in the
restaurant industry; rather, it would be counted in the software industry.
of December 3 1s", and firm and establishment counts are from March 12th. Therefore, I match
March 12, 2005 firm count data to the 2004 industry employment data, and then to the December
31, 2004 capital stock data. Other years follow the same pattern. The first year in my sample is
1998, which is matched to March 12, 1999 firm counts. Therefore, there are 7 years worth of
matched data.
My dataset has the following limitations. One is that my first industry-year observations
begin in 1998, and in terms of information and communications technologies, 1995 marked a
watershed year of Internet adoption. I am constrained from using earlier years due to the
switchover from SIC to NAICS industry codes by the U.S. government. My matches from 1998-
2005 are all consistent with each other because the data is in NAICS. By attempting to combine
SIC and NAICS, I risk affecting my entry and expansion results, which could be sensitive to
changing industry definitions.
I cannot directly observe firm or industry costs, and so I assume that capital is a fixed
cost. I also cannot observe capital stocks beyond the 2 or 3 digit NAICS level, and thus, all data
in my analysis is summed to this level of aggregation.2 '
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 lists the summary statistics for the 53 IT-using industries from 1998-2004.22 For
a perspective on the U.S. economy as a whole, Table 2 lists value-added per employee, ordinary
capital per employee, and IT capital per employee for each year from 1998-2004. There is a
significant difference between the growth rates of IT and ordinary capital per worker in the U.S.
21 Firm-level IT data is very difficult to obtain, especially for small companies. The U.S. Census Bureau has firm-
level data for IT investment at the firm level, but this series begins only in 2003 and is available only to deputized
Census researchers.
22 I list this data through 2004 since that is the last year with flow data matched to March 2005 firm and
establishment count data.
economy. Ordinary capital grew from $90,359 to $96,459 per worker, or about 1.1% per year on
average. IT capital per worker grew at 10.1% per year during this same period, from $6,426 to
$11,438 in constant dollars. Note that this period includes the bursting of the "technology
bubble." Much of this constant-dollar increase was due to quality adjustments in processing
speed and capacity of computing, as Moore's law continued to hold.
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Entry and Expansion
This paper examines how changes in capital intensity affect the dynamics of entry and
expansion for both small and large firms. I base my analysis on the establishment births at the
industry level. Table 3, based on published data from the SBA, displays national data on
establishment openings. According to Line 3 of the table, 768,420 establishments opened in
2004. Line 1 denotes that 644,122 of them, or about 81.7%, represented firm births. Line 2
denotes that the other 124,298 establishment openings represented existing firms that opened a
new branch, plant, or store in a secondary location.
Therefore, even though I can only observe establishment entry and exit for specific
industries and not firm entry and exit, I can make some plausible assumptions to relate
establishment openings to firm entry and expansion.23 First, looking at the column of firms with
1-4 people, I note that 99.97% of establishment births represent firm births. This makes sense:
One wouldn't expect that many businesses of less than five people would open second
establishments. By combining the published data for firms of 1-4, 5-9, and 10-19 employees, I
23 Using public data, I cannot directly observe if an establishment opening by a large firm in industry 2 comes from
a firm operating in industry 1 that opens a new establishment in industry 2, or whether it is from a firm already in
industry 2 that expands by opening another establishment. Nor can I directly observe a firm birth at the detailed
industry level (but I can at the sectoral and national level).
note that of the 616,651 establishments that were opened by firms of less than 20 employees,
616,019 of them-or more than 99.9%-represented new firm births. Therefore, I assume that
any establishment birth by a firm of this size is a new firm entering the industry.
I can make a similarly plausible assumption about large firms based on Table 3. Firms
with more than 500 employees opened a total of 102,999 establishments in 2004 (Line 3), and
102,727 of them, or 99.74%, represented firm expansions (Line 2). This is fairly intuitive since
one would not find many new firms that grew to 500 people or more within their first year.
There were only 272 of these brand new large firms in 2004 (Line 1 in the column of firms with
500+ employees). Therefore, I am going to assume that every establishment opening by a firm
of more than 500 people is an expansion by an existing firm either from the same industry or
another industry.
Using these assumptions, I relate the establishment birth data to small firm entry and
large firm expansion:
Small Firms
I estimate the following models using fixed-effects specifications to analyze the sources
of new firm growth in each industry:
ln(small),, = P, In(c + k),, + I, + T, + e,, (2)
ln(small),, = ,1 ln(c),, + f2 ln(k),, + I, + T, + e,, (3)
The variable small,, represents the number of establishment openings by firms with less than 20
people in industry i at the end of year t.24 I assume that these small establishments represent new
firm births. The constant-dollar capital stock of hardware, software, and communications
24 I match the measure of firm counts from the Census Bureau of March 12th of one year to the capital stock
measurements from December 31st of the previous year.
equipment per firm in year t is represented by c,, and the constant-dollar capital stock of
ordinary capital per firm is represented by k,,. I include a time-constant dummy variable for
each industry, which is represented by I,. I also include a dummy variable for each year, T, . I
use the natural logarithm of small entrants and capital to examine percentage changes in each
variable.
Using a panel estimator, I control for industry-specific heterogeneity and need not be
concerned with initial levels of the variables being studied. I am more confident about the
estimates using this approach rather than a traditional cross-sectional regression where I would
attempt to control for other covariates. A considerable advantage is that I control for the
unobserved variables (or ones which would be very difficult to measure) that would affect entry,
exit, or the number of firms in each industry.
I examine whether more aggregate capital per firm in an industry discourages entry by
small firms. Therefore, I test Pc+k = 0 against the one-sided alternative that Dc+k < 0 from
equation (2). In (3), I test p, = 0 against the alternative that pc > 0, that IT capital allows more
small firms to enter markets by reducing fixed costs. In order to measure whether ordinary
capital intensity acts as a barrier to entry for small firms, I test #k = 0 against the alternative that
k <0.
I examine a similar set of hypothesis using a relative, rather than an absolute, measure of
entry. I use small _rel as the left-hand-side variable, which represents the number of
establishment births that come from firms with less than 20 people, for every 100 establishment
births that occur in that industry. As shown in Table 3, small firms (with less than 20
employees) and large firms (with more than 500 employees) accounted for 94% of all
establishment openings in the United States from 2004-2005. Thus, a relative measure of entry
can provide a better comparison of where establishment growth is coming from-small firms or
large firms. Using relative entry of small firms, I test P, = 0 against the alternative that /, e 0.
It is unclear a priori whether establishment openings will come predominantly from small firms
or large expansions as the industry becomes more IT capital-intensive. My hypothesis is that
ordinary capital intensity should be associated with less establishment growth coming from small
firms, and, thus, I test ,,k = 0 against the one-sided alternative that 8c+k <0 and #k = 0 against
the alternative that Pk <0.
Large Firms
Among large firms, the variable large,, represents the number of establishment births that
come from firms with greater than 500 employees.
ln(large),, = Jp, In(c + k),, + I, + T + e,, (4)
ln(large),, = P, ln(c),, +#82 ln(k),, + I, + 7 + E,, (5)
My hypotheses regarding firm expansion in the face of higher total capital intensity are different
than the ones for small firms. In this case, an increase in total capital intensity should be
associated with large firms taking a greater share of the market, as higher fixed costs should
favor large firms (and thus expansion). Thus, the hypotheses I test are # c+k = 0 against #C+k > 0 ,
and 8, = 0 against the alternative that /k > 0. Regarding higher IT intensity and large firm
expansion, I test #c = 0 against #c > 0 to determine whether large firms use IT to better
coordinate and thus expand their operations. I also test /3 = p, against the alternative that
Pc # k
As with the case for small firms, I also test relative expansion versus total establishment
openings in the industry. The variable I use is large-rel,,, which is establishment openings by
firms of 500 or more employees per 100 establishment births that occur in that industry. I
assume that these large births represent expansions of existing firms. My hypotheses and
alternatives about total and ordinary capital are the same. However, I test 8 = 0 against the
alternative that p, w 0 because it is an open question as to whether establishment openings
would, on net, come from the large firms or small firms.
Turnover
To further complete the picture of how IT has changed the dynamics of entry in the U.S.
economy, I examine turnover in addition to gross and relative entry. Examining turnover
supplements my analysis of entry by including existing firms. I create the variable turnoverh,
which is 100 times the number of establishment births plus establishment deaths, divided by the
number of establishments at the beginning of the period. This provides a useful measure of
small firm births and deaths because virtually all establishment births and deaths of firms with
fewer than 20 employees are firm births and deaths.
Industry Concentration
Examining the total number of firms and their size distribution complements the analysis
of entry. I analyze whether capital intensity is related to a shift in the size distribution towards
larger or smaller firms. For example, if capital intensity was negatively associated with entry but
positively associated with more small firms in an industry, it would be an indication that
although conditions in the industry appear to favor small firms, entry is being blocked or
otherwise discouraged. I create left-side variables that account for the total number of firms in
each size class, and the percentage of firms within them.
By examining the distribution of firm sizes, I can account for establishment
reclassification and growth or decline of existing firms. If an establishment changes the majority
of its business from one industry to another, then it will not appear as an establishment opening
or closing, but will instead appear as a change in the firm and establishment counts at the
industry level. Or, if a firm with 19 employees grows to 25, then that firm will disappear from
the small firms group (less than 20 employees) within the distribution.
Lastly, I examine the hypothesis that capital intensity is related to industry concentration
because capital is substituting or complementing labor (Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and
Kambil 1994, p. 1631). Using industry value-added as a left hand-side variable, va, , I examine
its relationship with IT and ordinary capital intensity. If capital intensity was associated with
smaller firm sizes, for example, but there was no relationship between capital intensity and
industry value added, then one explanation would be that capital is substituting for labor
(Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil 1994, p. 1 637).
RESULTS
My results demonstrate that an increase in IT per firm in an industry is associated with
both more entry by small firms, and more expansion by large firms (from the same and other
industries). In contrast, an increase in ordinary capital per firm is associated with less small firm
entry and less large firm expansion. Relatively speaking, large firms open establishments faster
than small firms enter as an industry increases its IT intensity. Examining the competitive
conditions within the industry, IT is also associated with more turnover of small firms, but more
ordinary capital is associated with less small firm turnover. Finally, an increase in IT is
associated with more firms in every size class, and a greater percentage of the industry as large
firms. Increases in ordinary capital are associated with fewer firms in every size class and
industry fragmentation into small firms.
In this section, I examine entry, expansion, turnover, and firm size results. Combining
these results, I conclude that small firms are entering more IT intensive industries despite the fact
that there is a higher rate of turnover and more of the industry is shifting into large firms. Thus,
IT capital intensity does not serve as a barrier to entry for small firms, although ordinary capital
intensity does.
Small Firm Entry
An increase in total capital intensity in an industry is associated with less small firms
entering the industry, as I hypothesized earlier. This result can be found in Table 4, where I
easily reject that 8,,k = 0 against the alternative that p+k < 0 (Column 2). Yet the results are
markedly different when total capital is disaggregated into IT capital and ordinary capital.
While an increase in ordinary capital serves as a barrier to entry, an increase in IT capital
is associated with more entry of small firms. As Column 4 indicates, a 10% increase in real
ordinary capital per firm is associated with about 8.3% fewer small entrants. I reject #k = 0 in
favor of k < 0 at the 1% level of significance. I also reject P, = 0 against the alternative that
# > 0, and note that a 10% increase of IT capital per firm is associated with a more than 2%
increase in small entrants in that industry, holding other types of capital constant.
However, my results indicate that IT capital intensity does not lead to a greater share of
all establishment openings coming from small entrants. None of my results in Columns 5-8 are
significant even at the 10% level. In other words, there is no significant relationship between
capital intensity and the percentage of establishment openings that represent small firm entrants.
This is true with respect to all capital as well as when capital is disaggregated into IT and
ordinary capital.
Large Firm Expansion
While I find that an increase in total capital per firm as well as an increase in ordinary
capital per firm are strongly associated with less firm expansion, an increase in IT capital per
firm is associated with more large firm expansion. In comparing large firm expansion and small
firm entry, I find that large firms are expanding at a faster rate than small firms are opening.
Table 5 illustrates these findings. An increase of 10% in capital per firm in an industry is
associated with 6.9% fewer establishment expansions (Column 2), while a 10% increase in
ordinary capital per firm is associated with 14.2% fewer establishment births by large firms
(Column 4). Yet, a 10% increase in IT capital per firm in an industry is associated with 6.1%
more establishment births by large firms (Column 4). All of these results are strongly
significant.
IT capital, as opposed to ordinary capital, is thus uniquely associated with large firm
expansion. This expansion comes from 1) firms already in the industry that add another
establishment, and 2) firms in other industries that open an establishment in a new industry for
the first time. A 10% increase in IT per worker is associated with an increase of 0.7
establishment openings by large firms for every 100 industry establishment openings (Column
8). However, more ordinary capital per firm is clearly not associated with more establishment
openings coming from large firms (Column 8). I reject that p, = #, against the alternative that
f# # #k at the 10% level of significance (with a p-value of 0.0566).
I do not analyze entry and expansion by firms that employ between 20 and 499 people.
Even though these firms account for one-third of U.S. employment (Table 6), 94% of
establishment openings in the United States occur in firms with less than 20 employees or more
than 500 employees (Table 3). Compared to establishment openings by small or large firms, it
less clear whether establishment openings by firms between 20 and 499 employees represent
firm births or expansions. 25
Turnover
A useful measure of the competitive environment is establishment turnover, which for
small firms almost always represents firm birth and death. (Whereas for large firms, it almost
always represents an expansion or closing of secondary locations). As an industry becomes
more ordinary capital-intensive, I find that there is less turnover among small firms (Table 7,
Column 4). However, as the industry becomes more IT intensive, there is significantly more
turnover among small firms (Column 4). Is the same true for large firms? The answer is no, as
Columns 5 through 8 indicate that none of the coefficient estimates are significant.
Industry Concentration
An alternative hypothesis concerning IT and small firm entry is the following: Suppose
that IT has nothing to do with encouraging small firm entry but that more IT and more small firm
entry is a coincidence. There may already be favorable conditions in the industry that are
leading to the breakup of the industry into small firms. This might be the reason for small firm
entry - i.e., potential entrants observe these favorable conditions towards industry fragmentation
and decide to enter. If this were the case, then I would expect that a greater percentage of the
firms in an industry to be small as it becomes more IT intensive. Likewise, given that there is
25 However, as I note in Table 3, when a firm that employs 20-99 people opens an establishment, it represents a new
firm 86% of the time. Similarly, when a firm that employs 100-499 people opens an establishment, it represents an
expansion 87% of the time.
less entry by small firms as the industry becomes more ordinary capital-intensive, I would expect
that there would be fewer small firms as a share of all firms in the industry.
However, this is not the case. Table 8 (Columns 5-8) indicates that while there are more
firms in an industry as it becomes more IT intensive, it is clear that the increase in firms is from
the top of the size distribution. Increases in aggregate capital or ordinary capital are clearly
associated with fewer firms in each size category, with the most significant decreases coming
from large firms. For another perspective, I display firm sizes as a percentage of all firms in
Table 9. IT capital is associated with a smaller percentage of firms that are small and a greater
percentage that are large (Columns 5-8). An increase in ordinary capital per firm is associated
with a greater percentage of the industry as small firms and less of the industry as large firms
(Columns 5-8).
I find that IT capital intensity is associated with not only a shift of the industry into larger
firms, but also with increases in industry value-added. A 10% increase in IT per firm is
associated with 2.4% more industry value-added (Table 10, Column 4). However, a 10%
increase in ordinary capital per firm is not associated with a statistically significant reduction in
industry value-added (Table 10, Column 4). Therefore one possible explanation for the industry
shift into smaller firm sizes could be due to the fact that firms are substituting ordinary capital
for labor (Brynjolfsson, Malone, Gurbaxani and Kambil 1994, p.1637).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I examined whether IT has leveled the competitive playing field between
small and large firms in the U.S. economy using three different measures: entry, turnover, and
industry concentration. On the first measure, I found that while increasing ordinary capital per
firm served as a barrier to entry, increasing IT capital per worker was associated with more entry
by small and large firms. I also found that more IT was associated with a greater percentage of
establishment openings coming from large firms rather than small firms. On the second
measure, I found that while an increase in IT was associated with entry by small firms, there was
also more small firm turnover. In contrast, an increase in ordinary capital was associated with
less turnover of small firms.
On the third measure, industry concentration, IT intensity was associated with a shift of
the industry into larger firms, while ordinary capital intensity was associated with industry
fragmentation into smaller firms. Large firms can use IT to coordinate activities among their
establishments and compete against small firms in dispersed, geographic markets. When it
comes to products and services, a large firm can identify an innovation in a small firm and then
use IT to replicate it across its establishments (McAfee 2005; Winter and Szulanski 2001). This
reflects the ability of large firms to use IT to create economies of scale and scope. In contrast,
there may be less direct competition between small and large firms as an industry becomes more
ordinary capital-intensive. Small firms may differentiate themselves with niche products in
order to avoid competition with large firms. This is further suggested by my finding that
ordinary capital intensity is associated with less turnover of small firms. There is also the
possibility that ordinary capital is substituting for labor.
If IT is associated with large firm expansion and entry and more turnover of small firms,
then why would there be greater entry by small firms into IT intensive industries? One
possibility is that new small firms can use IT to gain market share despite their size. Another
possible explanation is that small entrants could be pursuing a buy-out strategy of entering and
then hoping to be purchased by a larger firm. Future studies should be conducted with firm-level
data to address the motivation behind entry of small firms into IT intensive versus less IT
intensive industries.
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APPENDIX A. TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample:
53 industries, 1998-2005 for 371 observations
StandardMean Deviation Minimum Median Maximum
Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Employees
Firms
IT plus Ordinary Capital per FTE, constant 2000
dollars
IT Capital (Hardware, Software and
Communications Equipment) per FTE,
constant 2000 dollars
Ordinary Capital per FTE, 2000 dollars
IT plus Ordinary Capital per firm, constant 2000
dollars
IT Capital per firm, constant 2000 dollars
Ordinary Capital per firm, 2000 dollars
Establishment births from firms of less than 20
employees
Establishment births from firms of less than 20
employees, per 100 establishment births in the
industry
Establishment births from firms of 500 or more
employees
Establishment births from a firm of 500 or
more employees, per 100 establishment births
in the industry
Percentage of firms with less than 20
Employees
Percentage of firms with 20-99 Employees
Percentage of firms with 100-499 Employees
Percentage of firms with more than 500
Employees
Turnover: Establishment births plus deaths
divided by the number of establishments in the
initial year -
with firms of less than 20 employees
Turnover: Establishment births plus deaths
divided by the number of establishments in the
initial year -
with firms of more than 500 employees
1,830,954 2,460,264 36,000 792,000 13,667,000
110,442 196,520 233 26,121 777,664
$297,581 $617,410 $10,406 $92,649 $3,954,813
$18,610 $44,431
$278,971 $600,687
$19,646,346 $50,670,096
$1,722,796 $6,294,435
$17,923,548 $45,426,788
10,601
70.5
1,774
17.5
76.9
14.5
5.0
3.5
25.5
17.2
19,967
20.5
3,524
19.0
15.1
7.3
5.2
5.7
$354 $4,863 $275,436
$8,491 $83,350 $3,934,032
$107,701 $3,466,036 $367,914,560
$6,411 $164,604 $44,464,984
$93,204 $3,375,381 $323,449,536
14 1,805
22.1
3.1
0.5
0.1
7.3 14.2
9.0
98,479
76.5
198
10.3
80.0
15.1
97.2
22,253
95.2
95.9
35.8
30.9
36.2
65.324.5
15.0 48.8
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the U.S. Economy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Totals Per Full-Time Equivalent Employee
Value C+K K C L Value c+k k c
Added Added
Billions Billions Billions Billions (Millions) (2000 (2000 (2000 (2000
of 2000 of 2000 of 2000 of 2000 Dollars) dollars) dollars) dollars)
Year dollars dollars dollars dollars
1998 7,896.0 9,726.9 9,081.1 645.8 100.5 $78,567 $96,785 $90,359 $6,426
1999 8,285.0 10,105.8 9,335.1 770.7 103.2 $80,281 $97,925 $90,456 $7,468
2000 8,614.3 10,513.8 9,596.3 917.5 105.6 $81,575 $99,563 $90,874 $8,688
2001 8,692.5 10,795.1 9,779.7 1,015.5 105.6 $82,315 $102,227 $92,611 $9,616
2002 8,817.1 10,960.4 9,888.9 1,071.5 104.0 $84,780 $105,388 $95,086 $10,303
2003 9,050.9 11,108.6 9,982.3 1,126.3 103.4 $87,533 $107,433 $96,541 $10,893
2004 9,406.6 11,275.2 10,079.9 1,195.2 104.5 $90,015 $107,896 $96,459 $11,438
Column 1. GDP by Industry Accounts, Real Value Added by Industry, Line 2, Private Industries.
Column 2. Capital is total nonresidential equipment plus nonresidential structures for the private sector,
converted to constant 2000 dollars.
Column 3. Sum of non-IT equipment and structures, in constant 2000 dollars.
Column 4. Sum of Computers, Software and Communications equipment, in constant 2000 dollars.
Column 5. BEA Table 6.5D, Full Time Equivalent Employees by Industry, Line 3, Private
Industries.
Table 3: Establishment Births in 2004 by Firm Size
Employment Size of the Firm
Total 1-4 5-9 10-19 20-99 100-499 500+
1. Establishment birth,
original location (new firms) 644,122 493,406 83,008 39,605 25,321 2,510 272
2. Establishment birth, 124,298 140 158 334 4,245 16,694 102,727
secondary location
3. Total 768,420 493,546 83,166 39,939 29,566 19,204 102,999
Addenda: New firm birth as
a percentage of 81.70 99.97 99.81 99.16 85.64 13.07 0.26
establishment birth (1)/(3)
Source: Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy. Data represents establishment births from March 12,
2004 through March 12, 2005.
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Table 4: Small Firm Dynamics as Function of Capital Intensity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent Variable Ln(small) Ln(small) Ln(small) Ln(small) smallrel small_rel small_rel small_rel
Ln((C+K)/Firm) -0.416 -0.540 1.59 1.57
[0.101] [0.098] [4.41] [5.30]
Ln(C/Firm) 0.131 0.213 -0.128 -3.91
[0.042] [0.094] [1.64] [2.93]
Ln(K/Firm) -0.752 -0.830 1.55 5.16
[0.114] [0.126] [7.07] [6.89]
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 371 371 371 371 371 371 371 371
R2  0.071 0.134 0.158 0.199 0.001 0.176 0.001 0.183
Fixed effects estimation, robust standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable for "Small Entry" in Columns 1-4 is the natural
logarithm of the number of small establishment openings (from firms with less than 20 employees). Dependent variable for "Relative
Small Entry" in Columns 5-8 is the number of small establishment openings (from firms with less than 20 employees) for every 100
establishment openings in the industry.
*Significant at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level, ***Significant at the 1% level. R2 is for the "within" transformation.
Table 5: Large Firm Dynamics as Function of Capital Intensity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent Variable Ln(large) Ln(large) Ln(large) Ln(large) largerel large_rel large-rel largejel
Ln((C+K)/Firm) -0.705 -0.689 -4.95 -4.67
[0.280] [0.343] [4.93] [6.11]
Ln(C/Firm) 0.109 0.606 2.17 7.16
[0.102] [0.226] [1.74] [3.16]
Ln(K/Firm) -1.11 -1.42 -10.01 -11.80
[0.396] [0.400] [7.57] [7.71]
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 371 371 371 371 371 371 371 371
R2 0.025 0.029 0.043 0.065 0.006 0.045 0.017 0.067
Fixed effects estimation, robust standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable in Columns 1-4 is the natural logarithm of the number
of establishment openings from firms of greater than 500 employees. Dependent variable in Columns 5-8 is number of establishment
openings from firms of 500 or more employees for every 100 establishment openings in the industry.
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * **Significant at the 1% level. R2 is for the "within" transformation.
Table 6: Businesses with Paid Employees on March 12, 2005
Employment size of Enterprise
All
0-4 employees
5-9 employees
10-19 employees
20-99 employees
100-499 employees
500-9,999 employees
10,000 or more employees
Firms
5,983,546
3,677,879
1,050,062
629,946
520,897
87,285
16,565
912
Paid Employees
116,317,003
5,936,859
6,898,483
8,453,854
20,444,349
16,911,040
26,548,921
31,123,497
Source: Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy,
based on data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics of
U.S. Businesses.
Table 7: Establishment Turnover as a Function of Capital Intensity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent Small Small Small Small Large Large Large Large
Variable Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover Turnover
Ln((C+K)/Firm) -0.410 0.87 -2.84 -2.41
[2.26] [2.69] [4.94] [6.14]
Ln(C/Firm) -0.082 6.07 -2.11 -3.48
[0.726] [1.48] [1.72] [3.52]
Ln(K/Firm) -0.296 -4.64 0.20 0.06
[3.18] [2.90] [7.46] [7.74]
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 371 371 371 371 371 371 371 371
R2  0.000 0.090 0.000 0.162 0.002 0.019 0.007 0.023
Fixed effects estimation, robust standard errors in brackets. In Columns 1-4, the dependent variable is 100 times the number
of establishment births plus deaths from firms that employ less than 20 people divided by the number of establishments at the
beginning of the year in firms that employ less than 20 people. In Columns 5-8, the dependent variable is 100 times the
number of establishment births plus deaths from firms that employ 500 or more people divided by the number of
establishments in firns that employ 500 or more at the beginning of the year.
*Significant at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level, ***Significant at the 1% level. R2 is for the "within" transformation.
Table 8: Firm Size as a Function of Capital Intensity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent Ln(firms Ln(firms Ln(firms Ln(firms Ln(firms Ln(firms Ln(firms Ln(firms
Variable <20) 20-99) 100-499) 500+) <20) 20-99) 100-499) 500+)
Ln((C+K)/firm) -0.465 -0.514 -0.668 -0.986
[0.079] [0.0891 [0.177] [0.313]
Ln(C/Firm) 0.086 0.221 0.421 0.732
{0.041] [0.044] [0.080] [0.128]
Ln(K/Firm) -0.614 -0.787 -1.16 -1.83
[0.087] [0.082] [0.196] [0.36]
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 371 371 371 371 371 371 371 371
R2  0.365 0.288 0.222 0.189 0.446 0453 0.435 0.447
Fixed effects estimation, robust standard errors in brackets. In Columns 1 and 6, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of firms
with at least one establishment operating in that industry. In Columns 2 and 7, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of firms
that employ less than 20 people. In Columns 3 and 8, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of firms that employ between 20
and 99 people. In Columns 4 and 9, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of firms that employ between 100 and 499 people. In
Columns 5 and 10, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of firms that employ 500 or more people.
*Significant at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level, ***Significant at the 1% level. R2 is for the "within" transformation.
Table 9: Percent of Firms in Each Size Group as a Function of Capital Intensity
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
Variable <20 20-99 100-499 500+ <20 20-99 100-499 500+
Ln((C+K)/Firm) 6.35 -0.119 -1.89 -4.33[3.45] [0.465] [1.06] [2.11]
Ln(C/Firm) -6.81 0.802 1.89 4.12
[1.56] [0.346] [0.52] [1.00]
Ln(K/Firm) 13.38 -0.868 -3.84 -8.67
[4.29] [0.5531 [1.37] [2.69]
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 371 371 371 371 371 371 371 371
R2 0.092 0.158 0.088 0.093 0.255 0.176 0.209 0.265
Fixed effects estimation,
that employ less than 20
that employ between 20
robust standard errors in brackets.
for every 100 firms in the industry.
and 99 people for every 100 firms
number of firms that employ between 100 and 499 people
In Columns 1 and 5, the dependent variable is number of firms
In Columns 2 and 6, the dependent variable is number of firms
in the industry. In Columns 3 and 7, the dependent variable is
for every 100 firms in the industry. In Columns 4 and 8, the
dependent variable is number of firms that employ 500 or more people for every 100 firms in the industry.
*Significant at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level, ***Significant at the 1% level. R2 is for the "within" transformation.
Table 10: Industry Value-Added as a Function of Capital Intensity
1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable Ln(VA) Ln(VA) Ln(VA) Ln(VA)
Ln((C+K)/Firm) 0.152 0.079
[0.091] [0.1181
Ln(C/Firm) 0.146 0.238
[0.031] [0.053]
Ln(K/Firm) -0.121 -0.169
[0.142] [0.138]
Year Dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 371 371 371 371
R2 0.016 0.083 0.087 0.140
Fixed effects estimation, robust standard errors in brackets. Dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of industry value added.
*Significant at the 10% level, **Significant at the 5% level, ***Significant at the 1%
level. R2 is for the "within" transformation.
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APPENDIX B. DATA SOURCES
Industries
I begin with the 63 BEA industries that the Bureau of Economic Analysis uses to report
industry-level data, and condense them to 56 industries due to reconciling differences in
reporting among various data sources. I then drop three IT-producing industries to arrive at a
total of 53.
I do not use data for the following industries: Farms (NAICS 111 and 112) and Railroad
Transportation (NAICS 482) because they are not measured in the establishment or firms count
data. I aggregate the detailed industries in the Information Sector (NAICS 51) to the sector level,
due to a change in the industry codes in 2003. This is to preserve consistency between the BEA
Fixed Assets data (measured using 1997 NAICS codes) and Census firm size data (which uses
2003 NAICS for 2003-2005). I drop Federal Reserve Banks (NAICS 5210), because I focus on
the private business sector. I also combine Hospitals (NAICS 622) and Nursing and Residential
Care Facilities (NAICS 623) into one industry because the BEA aggregates them to report
industry value-added.
I further narrow the sample to 53 IT-using (or non-IT producing) industries by dropping
Computer and Electronic Products (NAICS 334), Computer Design and Related Services (5415),
and Information (NAICS 51). Ideally, I would drop the IT-producing industries of Software
Publishers (NAICS 5114) and Information and Data Processing Services (NAICS 514) instead of
the entire Information sector (NAICS 51). In 2003, detailed Information industries (at the 3 digit
NAICS level) were completely reclassified within the NAICS system, making it impossible to
match the public data before and after the change. Therefore, I aggregated the industries to the
2-digit sector level (NAICS 51), which could be smoothly matched across all the years in the
sample.
Industries used in this analysis appear in Table B. 1:
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Table B.1: BEA Industries Used in this Analysis
INDUSTRY TITLE (1997 NAICS-based)
1. Forestry, fishing, and related
activities
2. Oil and gas extraction
3. Mining, except oil and gas
4. Support activities for mining
5. Utilities
6. Construction
7. Wood products
8. Nonmetallic mineral products
9. Primary metals
10. Fabricated metal products
11. Machinery
12. Electrical equipment, appliances,
and components
13. Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers,
and parts
14. Other transportation equipment
15. Furniture and related products
16. Miscellaneous manufacturing
17. Food, beverage, and tobacco
products
18. Textile mills and textile product mills
19. Apparel and leather and allied
products
20. Paper products
21. Printing and related support
activities
22. Petroleum and coal products
23. Chemical products
24. Plastics and rubber products
25. Wholesale Trade
26. Retail Trade
27. Air Transportation
1997 NAICS
Codes
113-115
1997 NAICS
INDUSTRY TITLE (1997 NAICS-based) Codes
28. Water transportation 483
211 29. Truck transportation
212 30. Transit and ground passenger
transportation
213 31. Pipeline transportation
22 32. Other transportation and support activities
23 33. Warehousing and storage
321 34. Credit intermediation and related activities
327 35. Securities, commodity contracts,
and investments
331 36. Insurance carriers and related activities
332 37. Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles
333 38. Realestate
335 39. Rental and leasing services and lessors
of intangible assets
3361-3363 40. Legal services
3364-3369 41. Miscellaneous professional, scientific,
and technical services
337 42. Management of companies and
enterprises
339 43. Administrative and support services
311,312 44. Waste managementand
remediation services
313,314 45. Educational services
315,316 46. Ambulatory health care services
322 47. Hospitals and Nursing and
residential care facilities
323 48. Social assistance
324 49. Performing arts, spectator sports,
museums, and related activities
325 50. Amusements, gambling, and recreation
industries
326 51. Accommodation
42 52. Food services and drinking places
44-45 53. Other services, except government
481
101
484
485
486
487,488,492
493
522
523
524
525
531
532,533
5411
541 excl.
5411,5415
55
561
562
61
621
622,623
624
711,712
713
721
722
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Firm Size and Establishment Births and Deaths:
This data was downloaded from the U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of
Advocacy web site: http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/data.html. Data for firm sizes was
downloaded from http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/us98_02n97.txt and
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/us03_05nO2.txt. Data for establishment births and deat
downloaded from http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/dyn-us_98_05n4.txt.
Below, I reprint the Census Bureau definitions of establishments and paid employrr
Those are from http://www.census.gov/epcd/susb/introusb.htm and
http://www.census.gov/csd/susb/defterm.html.
hs was
ent.
Establishments
"An establishment is a single physical location at which business is conducted or services
or industrial operations are performed. It is not necessarily identical with a company or
enterprise, which may consist of one or more establishments. When two or more activities are
carried on at a single location under a single ownership, all activities generally are grouped
together as a single establishment. The entire establishment is classified on the basis of its major
activity and all data are included in that classification.
An establishment with 0 employment is an establishment reporting no paid employees in
the mid-March pay period, but paid employees at some time during the year."
Employees
"Paid employment consists of full- and part-time employees, including salaried officers
and executives of corporations, who are on the payroll in the pay period including March 12.
Included are employees on paid sick leave, holidays, and vacations; not included are proprietors
and partners of unincorporated businesses."
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Establishment Births
"Births are establishments that have zero employment in the first quarter of the initial
year and positive employment in the first quarter of the subsequent year."
Establishment Deaths
"Deaths are establishments that have positive employment in the first quarter of the initial
year and zero employment in the first quarter of the subsequent year."
Industry Classification
"Industry is assigned on an establishment by establishment basis. An enterprise with
establishments in more than one industry is counted as a firm in each industry in which it
operates an establishment. Nonetheless, as noted above, the employment size category is
assigned based on employment in the entire enterprise."
"A firm is defined as that part of an enterprise tabulated within a particular industry, state
or metropolitan area. For example, an enterprise with establishments in more than one state
would be counted as a firm in each state in which it operates an establishment, but is also
counted as only one firm in national all-industry tabulations. Thus, summing the firms across
areas or industries would overstate the number of unique firms. Employment size is determined
only for the entire enterprise. Hence, counterintuitive results are possible, for example, only 100
employees in a category of firms with 500 employees or more in a particular state."
"Industry is assigned on an establishment by establishment basis. An enterprise with
establishments in more than one industry is counted as a firm in each industry in which it
operates an establishment. Nonetheless, as noted above, the employment size category is
assigned based on employment in the entire enterprise."
103
Capital Stocks
This data comes from the BEA Detailed Fixed Assets Tables. The two tables are called
"Current-Cost Net Capital Stock of Private Nonresidential Fixed Assets" and "Chain-Type
Quantity Indexes for Net Capital Stock of Private Nonresidential Fixed Assets." For IT
equipment, I combine three categories: 1) Computers and Peripherals, 2) Software, and 3)
Communications Equipment.
I convert nominal quantities to constant-dollar (2000 dollars) in the following fashion: I
take the current-cost estimate of each capital stock in 2000, and then multiply that value by the
value from the quantity index table (in which all real quantities are expressed as 2000= 100).
This will yield values in constant 2000 dollars. I do this separately for equipment, structures,
and the three types of IT equipment listed above for constant dollar estimates. Non-IT
equipment is expressed as the difference between all equipment and the three types of IT
equipment.
Industry-Level Employment
This data comes from BEA National Income and Products Account Table 6.5D, "Full-
Time Equivalent Employees by Industry." It is defined as the number of full-time employees in
the industry, plus the number of part-time employees (that are converted to a full-time basis).
This table is available at:
http://bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=1 86&Freq=Year&FirstYear=200
6&LastYear=2007.
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This paper is based on joint work with Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin Hitt.
We use data on publicly traded high-tech companies from 1984-2002 to
examine the relationship between the firms' market value and their
patent-based intangible assets. We focus on three characteristics of their
patent stocks: quality, diversity, and generality. We also examine how
the value of the firms' intangibles changes when previous innovation
leaders are no longer at the frontier. Our analysis yields three main
findings. First, high-tech firms with patents that are cited by a wide
variety of other patents in different patent classes are worth significantly
more than firms with patents that are cited by a narrow range of patents.
Our second finding is that patent generality is especially valuable in
periods of change, when firms are no longer at the leading edge of
innovation in a particular year. Firms whose patents were highly
generalizable did not lose almost any market value despite the loss of
their leadership status. However, the firms whose patents were of low or
average generality suffered significant declines in market value. Our
third finding is that in periods of change, the value of diverse patents
across technology categories is positive but not significant and that
generality is comparatively more valuable than diversity. These results
suggest that patents with the greatest generality allow firms to most
easily adapt to the changing technological landscape in times of rapid
and potentially disruptive change.
SAP has provided generous funding for this research. We thank Paul Hofmann and Jason Yotopoulos from SAP
and the participants of the 2010 Workshop on Information Systems and Economics for their valuable insights. All
errors, of course, are our own.
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INTRODUCTION
Most publicly traded companies in the United States have market values that exceed their
book values, suggesting the presence of valuable yet uncounted intangible assets. While a
company's high market-to-book ratio suggests the present-day existence of intangible assets, we
cannot predict with any degree of certainty as to the value of those intangibles in the future. For
high-tech firms, the ability to continually innovate and adapt to changing market conditions,
which one might call a firm's dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997), is
especially crucial given the short cycle times for new product introductions. While it is well
documented that R&D and high-quality patents are correlated with significantly higher market
value (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005), the durability of this value is an open question. The
ability of a firm to maintain sustainable competitive advantage could change dramatically,
depending on technological shifts in the industry due to patenting behavior by rivals.
In this paper, we begin by estimating baseline relationships between three characteristics
of patent-based intangible assets in high-tech firms and market value: 1) quality, proxied by
citations per patent; 2) flexibility, as evidenced by generality; and 3) diversity, as indicated by
the number of technology categories of the firm's patent stock. We then analyze the value of
generality and diversity in periods of change-specifically, when a firm that was previously at
the frontier of innovation has recently declined in its leadership status. We combine Compustat
data with the NBER patent citations database to create a sample of 9,969 observations consisting
of all publicly traded high-tech firms in the United States from 1984-2002 with an R&D stock of
at least $1 million, a patent stock of at least 1, and any patenting activity in the previous 5 years.
Similar to Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005), we find that firms with high-quality
patents (as measured by forward citations) are worth significantly more than firms with low-
111
quality patents, robust to several different dependent variables and specifications of the
estimating equations. We also confirm previous scholarship that diversification as measured by
number of business segments is not correlated with additional market value.'
Our new findings are as follows: First, high-tech firms with patents that are cited by a
wide variety of patents in different patent classes are worth significantly more than firms with
patents that are cited by a narrow range of patents. To measure this patent flexibility, we use a
generality score for the patent base, a variable between 0 and 1 that measures the shares of
different patent classes that cites the firm's patents.2 Our second finding reveals that patent
flexibility is especially valuable for firms when they are no longer at the leading edge of
innovation in a particular year. Firms whose patents were highly generalizable did not suffer
almost any market value decline despite their the loss of their leadership status. However, the
firms whose patents were of low or average flexibility suffered significant declines in market
value. This loss of value was also evident in firms that reported multiple business segments or
had diverse patent bases. Overall, our results suggest that in high-tech industries, where
technology cycle times are short and innovation is especially rapid, the firms best able to
withstand the test of time are not the ones with diverse technologies, rather it is the firms with
the mostflexible technologies.
The motivation for this work is that current accounting standards are conservative when it
While Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) were the seminal papers that documented the
diversification discount in each year using static measures to compare single-segment and multi-segment firms,
Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004b) find that the decision by a firm to diversify is not necessarily
value-destroying by using more advance econometric techniques to consider the firm's decision to diversify (such as
fixed effects or instrumental variables). With their methods, the diversification discount disappears.
2 Patent generality is based on the dispersion of different 3-digit patent classes that cite an originating patent.
Generality is the sum of squared shares of 3-digit patent classes in the citations, then subtracted from 1. Patents with
all forward citations in one 3-digit patent class will have a measure of 0, whereas patents with citations in many
classes will have a measure approaching 1. We use a citation-weighted average of the firm's patents to arrive at a
generality score for the firm as a whole.
112
comes to reporting intangible assets. Firms are required to expense most investments in
advertising, R&D, human capital, and organizational capital, which means that spending in these
areas is not fully reflected on the balance sheet.3 This assumes that the value of intangible
spending is entirely captured in the current year, and does not translate into future benefits.
Thus, examining how well intangibles maintain their value over time (particularly in the face of
turbulence) sheds light on the question of whether intangibles should in fact be treated as assets
that endure over time.
We focus on patenting activity as a lens through which to analyze the quality, diversity,
and generality of intangible assets. Only certain kinds of innovation are patentable, and thus
patenting activity is much more important in some industries than in others. In this work, we
focus on high-technology firms, where patenting is an important source of intellectual property
protection and an indicator of innovation. As compared to firms in any other industry, high-tech
firms arguably face the most rapid cycle times and the greatest need to continually innovate, a
crucial source of value over time.
A number of scholars have attempted to place a value on uncounted intangible assets, but
they have not examined how those assets maintain their value in the face of volatility. Using
macroeconomic data, Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005, 2009) estimate that business spending
on intangibles not counted in U.S. GDP is at least as large as business investment that is counted
as part of GDP. They estimate the stock of intangible assets in the United States could be $3.6
trillion, while Nakamura (2001) estimates the stock of intangibles could be as high as $5 trillion
(based on different spending data on intangible investment in the United States).
3 One of the few exceptions is purchased goodwill, a residual that is listed when a company acquires another
company and then lists the difference between what it pays and the target's net assets.
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The existing literature using firm-level data has used the concept of market value to
calculate the value of the firm's intangibles, based on the underlying theory that the market value
of the firm should be equal to the sum of the firm's capital stocks (both tangible and intangible)
(Tobin 1969, Hayashi 1982, R. Hall 2000, 2001). Miller (2006) used market value equations to
find that firms with a diverse patent base across multiple business segments have significant
value. Barth et al. (1998) found that brand value estimates from Financial World magazine are
significantly and positively related to stock prices and returns. Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang
(2002) used a market value equation to estimate the value of information technology, and found
positive and significant excess value accruing to firms that had high levels of information
technology and complementary organizational practices. Saunders (2011) used similar
techniques to value IT-related intangible capital by converting direct spending measures on IT-
related intangibles into assets and estimating their value in a market-value equation.
Other papers have used Tobin's q, the ratio of a firm's market value to the replacement
cost of its tangible assets, to estimate the value of intangible assets. Griliches (1981) was the
first to empirically use this technique. It has subsequently been used by such scholars as
Cockburn and Griliches (1988) and Hall (1993) to measure the value of R&D, and Wernerfelt
and Montgomery (1988) to measure firm focus. Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) used Tobin's
q to measure the value of R&D, patents, and citations. Among other findings, they noted that
citations were significantly correlated with higher market value: Controlling for R&D spending
and the number of patents, firms in the 95* percentile of citations per patent (20 or more
citations) were worth 54% more than firms with the median number of citations per patent (with
5-6 citations). McGahan and Silverman (2006) found that a firm's Tobin's q was significantly
affected by the patenting activity by other firms. They further demonstrated that whether the
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effects added to firm value (through positive spillovers) or subtracted from firm value (because
of business stealing effects) depended on whether the innovation was by a rival in the same
industry or by an entity not in the same industry, as well as whether intellectual property
protection in the industry was strong or weak.
We contribute to this literature by examining whether firms with flexible intangible assets
(i.e., a general patent base) have more value and maintain that value over time as compared to
firms with inflexible intangible assets (i.e., a more specific patent base). We also compare the
effects of patent generality and diversity during periods of change, when firms are no longer at
the leading edge of innovation in a particular year. The advantage of using detailed patent data is
that we can analyze specific details about the nature of a firm's intangibles over and above the
aggregate R&D spending reported by the firm that is found in Compustat.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines our
conceptual framework and is then followed by our econometric model. We then describe the
data used in this study, follow with our results, and conclude with a summary and implications
for future research.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
We begin with the following model to describe firm value, first used by Griliches (1981)
and later used by Miller (2006) and Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005):
/= q,(A ,+ yRit X (1)
For firm i in year t, V, represents market value, A,, represents the value of the balance sheet
assets, and R,, represents the value of intangible assets. The term q,, represents the market
multiple for assets common to all firms, y represents the scaling factor for intangible assets, and
115
; is the scale parameter. Taking the natural logarithm, and assuming that a is equal to one,4
we have:
lnV, = lnq, + 1n(A, + y R,,) (2)
Separating A,, , we have
lnV, = lnq, +
(3)
R.
= lnq, +ln A, +ln(1+ y -')
Finally, by moving A,, to the left side of the equation and using the identity that Tobin's
q is market value divided by the replacement cost of the tangible assets of the firm, we have:
V R
In V, - In A, = ln( ")= In Q, = Inq, + ln(1+ y ")i it Ai, Ait (4)
where ln Q, is the natural log of the firm's Tobin's q, and ln q, is the log of the average Tobin's
q in each year. A number of papers (e.g., Griliches 1981, Hall 1993, Miller 2006) utilize the fact
that ln(1 + x) is approximately equal to x for small x, thus making the last term in (4)
R
approximately equal to y& ". However, Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) compute the full
it
R
semi-elasticity of ln(1 + y -') since R/A, the ratio of intangible assets to tangible assets, has
Ait
been growing, and thus for high-intangible firms this approximation becomes increasingly
inaccurate. They also modified the basic model in equation (1) to account for patents and quality
of citations, which becomes:
4 Which it approximately does in cross-sectional data; see Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005, p.23).
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In Ai, -(1+,y -')
P Cites,
V,, = q,(A,,+ y,1 R,,+ 2 A +-yA,, 'it)" (5)it I it + 72 At it it 
_t
where P, is the stock of the firm's patents, and Cites,, is the stock of the firm's citations. Taking
the log of both sides and rearranging yields:
R. Cites(,InQ,,=Inq,+1n(1+y,-t+y2 " +Y 3  ') (6)
Ai Rit Pt
We extend this basic model to include generality, as well as loss of leadership status, to
test the hypothesis that flexible intangibles are better able to hold their value when the firm is no
longer at the technological frontier. Our hypothesis is that the higher the generality of a firm's
patent stock, the broader its knowledge base and hence the better able it is to adapt as the rest of
the industry innovates in new directions.
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
In order to examine the relationship between the quality, diversity, and generality of
patents and how these characteristics interact with external change, we use a number of
estimating equations with various forms of Tobin's q as the dependent variable. As a baseline
estimate, our first dependent variable is the log of Tobin's q of the firm. We use several
specifications that begin with no industry controls and then include finer-grained measures for
industry controls (at the 3 and 4-digit SIC industry level). While industry dummy variables can
serve as good controls for effects for firms that operate in a single industry, or "pure-play" firms,
a number of firms operate in more than one industry and thus are conglomerates.
To account for multi-segment firms, we use a measure of a "chop-shop" Tobin's q (Lang
and Stulz, 1994) based on the Compustat Business Segment data. In these estimates, we use the
log of the ratio of Tobin's q divided by an imputed value Tobin's q based on the industry
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segments of the firm. As the benchmark q for each 4-digit SIC code, we use the median q of all
pure-play firms in that industry (based on Berger and Ofek, 1995).5 For the firm as a whole, the
imputed q is based on the imputed q from each of its industry segments, weighted by the assets
in each industry. For a single-segment firm, imputed q is simply the median q for its industry.
We use both ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects estimates. For slow-changing
ratios, such as the ratio of R&D to assets (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005), fixed effects may
bias the coefficients downward in the presence of measurement error (Griliches and Hausman,
1986). Thus, we may expect to see very different estimates for such ratios in fixed effect
specifications than OLS specifications. However, we also estimate several nonlinear
specifications with categorical variables (such as a firm being in the 5 0 *b-8 0th percentile of
citations per patent). Such variables may be subject to less measurement error: For instance, if
the ratio of R&D/assets moves from 21% to 25%, that may not represent actual changes in the
firm's R&D stock if our assumptions of R&D depreciation and price deflators are not very
applicable to the firm. In that case, we would be capturing measurement error rather than true
changes in R&D intensity. However, moving from category to category (such as the 5 0 -8 0 th, 80-
95 percentile and 95th and above percentile) is a more significant change (at least for those
firms not right at the cutoffs). Thus, we can be more confident that we are measuring true
economic phenomena rather than noise.
We seek to use a measure for external change that is reasonably exogenous and would
capture technological shifts that would specifically affect focal firms at the frontier of
5 Using median q rather than mean q is potentially a better indication of a benchmark q, as the distribution of
Tobin's q could get quite skewed especially with high-tech firms. Firms with an extremely high q will exert undue
influence on the industry average q, but not the median q.
6 While it would be ideal to use the replacement cost of assets in each segment (Lang and Stulz, 1994), the data
limitations in the segment data limit us to using the book value of assets in that segment. This is the standard
practice in the literature.
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innovation. We choose the frontier firms with high-quality patents because their values are
significantly higher than firms with average-quality patents (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2005).
Thus, while they have the most to gain when their patents are at the center of innovation activity
in a given year, they stand the most to lose when their innovation is not as central as it once was.
Our interest is in examining the potential reduction in market value to these high-performing
firms. We begin by examining the patenting activity in a given year and counting the number of
citations each firm receives in all patent applications of that year made by other entities (i.e.,
non-self citations). To adjust for size, we divide the total non-self citations by the patent stock of
the firm. We re-rank firms each year and code the top 20% of the sample as at the frontier of
innovation in that year. We examine what happens the following year if the firm loses its status
at the frontier, by creating a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is currently not an innovation
leader but had been the previous year. We examine to what extent the diversity and generality of
the firm's patents moderate the effects of moving away from the frontier.
DATA
We use publicly traded firms in the United States from 1984-2002 with at least one
business segment in high-tech, at least $1 million of R&D stock, a patent stock of at least 1, and
any patenting activity in the previous 5 years. The R&D and patent cutoffs are designed for two
reasons. The first is to keep the data reasonable-since we use ratios such as patents/R&D,
having very low values for the denominators can lead to some extreme and implausible
estimates. The second reason is that since our focus is on valuing the firms' patents based on
quality, diversity, and generality, and understanding how well patent-based intangible assets
respond to technical change in the industry, firms that have very little patenting or R&D activity
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are likely to have shifts in market value due to reasons other than changes in value of their
patent-based intangible assets.
Tobin's q
Tobin's q is constructed using the method in Chung and Pruitt (1994).7 The numerator is
the market value of the firm, computed as the firm's share price (Compustat mnemonic
PRCCF) times the number of common shares outstanding (CSHO), plus the value of the firm's
preferred stock (PSTK), the book value of long-term debt (DLTT), and the value of the firm's
short-term liabilities minus its short-term assets (LCT minus ACT). We divide the market value
by the book value of the firm's total assets (AT) and use this value for Tobin's q.
Excess Value
To compute a measure of industry-adjusted excess value, we do the following: For
single-segment firms, we take the natural logarithm of the ratio of the firm's q to the median q of
other single-segment firms in its industry. If there are less than five single-segment firms at the
4-digit SIC level in that year, we go successively to the 3, 2, and 1-digit SIC level until there are
at least 5 firms to generate each industry's benchmark. To compute excess Tobin's q for multi-
segment firms, we compute an imputed q for each of the firm's segments. Each segment is
assigned the median Tobin's q for single-segment firms in that segment's industry. We then
create an implied q for the firm by weighting each of the segment q values by the book value of
the assets in each segment. Finally, we take the natural logarithm of the ratio of the firm's q to
its imputed q as the measure of excess value.
7 Chung and Pruitt (1994) find that their approximation of Tobin's q explains at least 96.6% of the variability of the
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) method to calculate Tobin's q. While the Lindenberg-Ross method is acknowledged to
be more accurate, is a significantly more intricate calculation.
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The screening criteria in the Business Segment file to create the imputed qs are as
follows: We keep all segments that are classified as "business" or "operating" (dropping
segments classified by geography, for example). We drop segments classified as reconciliation
(if Segment ID, or SID in Compustat, is equal to 99), and segments that do not have an SIC code
associated with them. Since SIC codes are available on the Compustat Business Segment data in
WRDS beginning with 1984, we start with that year. We drop any firms that have any segments
in the financial sector (SIC 6000-6999), since Tobin's q is fundamentally different for these
firms (Berger and Ofek, 1995). We also drop firms with negative market value, segment assets,
or total firm assets. Finally, we drop those segments that are the only ones operating in a 4-digit
SIC in a given year, and we drop those firms that are the only ones operating in a 4-digit primary
SIC in a particular year.
Research and Development (R&D) Stock
For each firm, we create annual R&D stocks using the perpetual inventory method (PIM).
We start with the first year when the firm begins reporting R&D spending, commencing with
1959 and assuming an infinite service life.8 We convert all R&D current-dollar spending flows
into constant dollars using the BEA price deflator for R&D. 9 Following BEA practice (as well
as Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2005; Villalonga 2004c), we apply a 15% depreciation rate to
R&D.10 Since companies are required to report R&D spending if it exceeds 1% of sales (Zhao
2002), we assume a value of 0 for that year's R&D spending when it is not reported. Following
8 Given our depreciation rate of 15% per year, R&D spending in a given year is 96% depreciated after 20 years.
9 Source: Table 4.1, "Aggregate Input Price Indexes for R&D Investment, 1959-2007," line 10, Private Business.
Available at http://www.bea.gov/national/rd.htm.
1 The BEA uses 15% for all firms except for the following three industries: 18% for firms in Transportation and
Warehousing; 11% for Chemicals; and 16.5% for firms in Computers and Electronics. However, to be consistent
with Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) as well as with our depreciation rate for patents, we use 15% across the
board for all firms. Since our main dependent variable is excess value Tobin's q relative to the firm's industry, we
do not expect much distortion using 15% instead of 16.5%.
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BEA practice, we assume R&D spending is done at the halfway point in the year, and thus one-
half of a year's depreciation is applied to each year of R&D spending before being added to
R&D stock. Finally, we convert the constant-dollar R&D stocks back to current-dollar values
using the same BEA price deflator.
Brand Stock
Similar to how we calculate R&D stock, we use the perpetual inventory method to
aggregate advertising spending in each year as reported by the company, beginning with 1959.
To convert the nominal spending data into constant dollars, we create a composite advertising
price index from 1959-2002 based on combining three underlying price indices from different
years. For 1995 and afterwards, we use the Producer Price Index for advertising from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS)." For 1977-1994, we use the BEA Gross Output Price Index for
Miscellaneous Technical Services (the finest level of detail which includes the advertising
industry). For 1959-1976, we use the BEA Gross Output Price Index for Professional, Scientific,
and Technical Services (also the finest level of detail which includes the advertising industry
during that period). We use a 45% rate of depreciation for brand (based on Hirschey and
Weygand 1985; Villalonga 2004c), assume each year's worth of spending gets half a year's
worth of depreciation, and also use an infinite service life.' 2 Firms are required to disclose
advertising spending if it is material and thus we use a value of 0 for advertising spending if not
reported. We then convert the constant dollar values of brand stock back to current-dollars,
using the composite price index based on the different series as described above.
" The data series is called PCU541810541810. We use the December values of the "Not seasonally adjusted"
series.
12 Thus, $1 of constant-dollar advertising spending after 7.5 years worth of depreciation has lost approximately 99%
of its value.
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Patents
Our patent-based measures, which include patent counts, citations, and measures of
generality, are from the NBER Patent Citations Data File.13 The data includes more than 3
million patents granted between 1963-2006, with citations data beginning in 1976. (A thorough
description can be found in Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001.) The NBER Patent Citations Data
File matches each patent granted in the United States to its assignee, or in about 2% of cases, to
multiple owners.14 The data file matches patents belonging to publicly traded companies to their
corresponding GVKEY identifiers in Compustat and takes into account the fact that publicly
traded firms will acquire patents under a number of different assignee names (either as
subsidiaries, or because of misspellings and abbreviations), as well as changes in GVKEY over
time because of firm reorganization.' 5
In keeping with the literature (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2005, and others), we base the
patent stock according to application years rather than grant years. The average lag time from
patent application to grant is about 2 years, and it is reasonable to assume that the knowledge
provides benefit to the firm from the time it is produced, rather than 2 or more years later when
the patent is granted. Since patents in the United Sates are granted based on the first-to-file rule,
the application date is as close as possible to when the new knowledge was produced. Because
patents provide intellectual property protection for 20 years,16 we base our patent stock on the
"3 Available at https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home. Earlier versions of the data can be found at
http://www.nber.org/patents/ and Bronwyn Hall's website, http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-bhhall/.
" In the few cases where a patent has more than one assignee, we divide the patent and citation counts by the
number of assignees. For example, if a patent is granted to two different assignees, each assignee is assigned 0.5
patents, and the forward citations are split evenly between the two.
15 Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) note that IBM appears in at least 100 different assignee names such as IBM,
International Business Machines, Int'l Business Machines, etc.
16 The 20-year protection period pertains to patents applied for on or after June 8, 1995. For patent applications
before that date, it is the greater of either 17 years from the grant date, or 20 years from the filing date.
123
previous 20 years of patent applications, with each year's patent counts depreciated at a rate of
15% per year for all firms.
Citations
We use the number of forward citations for each patent through 2006 as a proxy for
patent quality. To construct citation stocks for each firm, we use the method in Hall, Jaffe and
Trajtenberg (2005). A numerical example would be as follows: Suppose a firm applies for a
patent in 1990, and after it is granted, receives 30 forward citations until the end of 2006. All 30
citations are added together and thus the firm's citation stock is 30 in 1990.17 This stock is then
depreciated by 15% per year until the end of 2006, at which point it would be equal to 2.2.
Although the patent data continues through 2006, we end our analysis with 2002 for two
reasons. The first is because of citation truncation, as it takes a number of years for a patent to
build up citations - even blockbuster patents granted in 2006 will likely have very few citations
by the end of 2006. However, truncation can be an issue to some extent for any patent,' 8 and so
Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) develop a model that accounts for any truncation by
estimating a deflator to apply to patents in different years to make citation counts comparable.
The model takes into account that some fields (such as computers and communications) tend to
gather more citations than do other fields (such as chemicals). We use the deflators that are
included in the NBER Patent Citations Database to adjust citations accordingly.
The other reason for ending in 2002 is that the patent database includes all patents that
were granted through the end of 2006. Thus, any patents that were applied for, but not yet
granted, before December 31, 2006, are not in the dataset. Four years is a suitable amount of
17 The assumption is that a patent is most valuable when it is newly created, which in this hypothetical case is 1990.
18 Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) use a 35-year simulated citation lifetime for patents, although they note that a
handful of patents are cited 150 years after being granted.
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time between patent applications and patent grants since the average grant time for a patent is 2
years, and about 98% are granted within 4 years (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001, p.47).
Generality
Patent generality is based on the dispersion of different 3-digit patent classes by patents
that cite an originating patent, constructed as the following (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001,
p.21):
G=1-Is (7)
where s. represents the percentage of citations received by patent i that belong to patent classj,
out of the ni different patent classes that cited patent i. Patents cited in a wide variety of classes
will have a generality score that approaches 1, whereas patents cited by other patents in only one
technology class will have a score of 0.
Because this measure can be biased for patents with a small number of citations (Hall,
Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001, pp.44-46), we adjust generality as the following:
( n
cites n- i
cites - )1 J (8)
We weight the generality score for each patent by its depreciated citation total to create
the generality score for the entire firm.
Loss of Leadership
We analyze all backward citations from USPTO patent applications made in each year by
companies in our sample. We aggregate all non-self citations to up to 20 previous years of
patents owned by sample companies for each application year. The following, for example, is
how we construct the measure for IBM in 1984. In that year, there were 67,096 patent
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applications made to the USPTO by individuals, corporations, universities, governments, and
nonprofits, both foreign and domestic. There were 227,667 backward citations by the 1984
applications made to all patents granted since 1976.19 We match citing-cited pairs20 to
ownership data. Of the 227,667 citations made in that year, 2,789 were to IBM patents from
non-IBM patent applications-the most non-self citations of any publicly traded company in that
year. We then divide 2,789 by the number of patents in IBM's patent stock, which in 1984 was
3,332.6. Thus, IBM would have approximately 0.837 non-self-citations per patent in 1984. We
rank firms each year and code the top 20% of the high-tech sample as at the frontier of
innovation in that year. A loss of leadership is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is not in
the top 20% but had been in the previous year.
Sample Construction
We begin with all publicly traded nonfinancial companies in Compustat, and keep firms
that do not have missing values of year, assets, market value, and sales. We drop firms whose
primary industry code makes them the only publicly traded firm in their 4-digit SIC. We also
drop a small number of GVKEYs that the NBER patent citation database has identified as a
secondary identifier for the firm. We start with 1984, the first year in which historical SIC codes
are available on Compustat at the segment level, and end in 2002, because of the truncation and
grant lag issues described above. After calculating excess value using the business segment data,
19 Because citation data starts in 1976, if a patent from 1984 cited a patent from 1960, then that citation link would
not be recorded. Early years of our sample then do not have as many years to measure citations as, for instance,
2002, which would have more than 25 years. However, patents in computers and communications receive
approximately half their citations after 8 years (Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2001, p.53), so even the earliest sample
years will have usable data. More work needs to be done to determine how many years back constitutes a useful
measure of the technological frontier of a firm's patents.
20 That is, each linkage of the 67,096 citing patents to the 227,667 cited patents.
21 Another 616 citations were made by IBM patent applications to previous IBM patents, for a total of 3,405
citations made to IBM patents from all sources in 1984.
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we drop firms with less than $1 million in R&D, a patent stock of less than 1, and no patenting
activity in the previous five years, leaving us with a sample of 9,969 firm-years of data.
RESULTS
Our results include a detailed analysis of the dataset; the relationship between the quality,
diversity, and generality of patent-based intangibles and market value; and the durability of
patents in the face of technical change. We first compare measures of diversification using the
reported number of business segments with measures based on patent data. While only one-
quarter of the observations report being diversified into more than one business segment,
patenting activity reveals potentially far more diversification than what is actually reported.
Depending on the assumptions used, 60-87% of the observations could be considered diversified.
We find that using either business segments or technology categories of patents, high-tech firms
are becoming more focused rather than diversified over the sample period of 1984-2002. We
also observe that single-segment or single-technology firms are consistently correlated with a
higher average and median Tobin's q than multi-segment or multiple-technology firms.
Our baseline estimates relating Tobin's q and excess value based on segment data
indicate that R&D, patents, and citations are all correlated with higher market value, either in
OLS or fixed effects specifications. While multi-segment firms are correlated with significantly
less value than single-segment firms (or not significantly different from zero), we have
conflicting results on the value of diversification for multi-technology firms. In OLS
specifications, multiple technology categories are correlated with either zero or positive value,
whereas in fixed-effects specifications, firms that add more technology categories are correlated
with significantly less value than focused firms in one category.
127
We then examine how nonlinearities in three aspects of the firm's patent-based
intangibles-quality, diversity, and generality-relate to market value. Similar to Hall, Jaffe and
Trajtenberg (2005), we find that large and significant market premiums are associated with firms
with high-quality patents. In terms of patent diversity, our results in nonlinear specification are
similar to our earlier results: While the most diversified firms based on the number of
technology segments are correlated with the largest market values in our OLS specifications, in
fixed effects specifications very diversified firms are correlated with large, negative, and
significant decreases in market value. While there is no significant relationship between patent
generality and market value in the linear specifications, nonlinear specifications for patent
generality reveal important effects at the ends of the distribution: Firms with highly general
patents (in the 9 0th percentile and above) are correlated with higher value than firms at any other
level of generality in their patent base. Moreover, firms with an average level of generality (3 3rd-
66th percentile) are correlated with lower value than both firms with narrow patents (0-10th
percentile) and firms with highly general patents in virtually every specification.
Finally, we find that flexible intangibles (i.e., general patents) maintain their value in
periods of change better than inflexible patents (patents of low generality), when firms at the
innovation frontier are no longer at the forefront of that year's patenting activity. Losing
technical leadership is correlated with a significant loss of market value (13-30% in our main
specifications) for firms with a low or average level of generality of their patents, whereas firms
with the most general patents lost almost no or very little value. Technical diversity, however,
did not moderate the loss in market value the way that flexibility did. During periods of change,
we find that the value of diverse patents across technology categories is positive but not
significant and that generality is comparatively more valuable than diversity. This suggests that
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flexibility of patents is valuable by enabling firms to adapt to technical change in high-tech
industries.
We will now provide a detailed description of each table that covers the aforementioned
results. In Table 1, we list sample statistics, and in Table 2, we tabulate the number of reported
business segments. Almost three-quarters of the observations in our sample are single-segment
firm-years. The majority of firms in our sample are from the manufacturing sector and tend to
report less diversification than service-sector firms.2 2 Approximately half of the business
segments in our sample are from high-tech manufacturing, and the other half come from
communications services, software, and computer-related services. In our screening procedure,
we include firms with at least one high-tech business segment, resulting in a sample of
approximately 80% of business segments being classified as high-tech, and the other 20% being
classified outside of high-tech (most of which are in non-high-tech manufacturing).
Villalonga (2004a) observed that business segments are incomplete measures of
diversification since they are publicly reported by firms; in fact, most firms that reported as
single-segment were actually diversified when using establishment measures from the U.S.
Census Bureau. Based on this insight, we use patent data as a way to examine the scope of the
firm beyond what business segments would indicate. In Table 3, we divide the patents in our
sample according to the knowledge categories as defined by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001).
Approximately 80% of the patents and 85% of the citations held by firms in our sample come
from the following three fields: computers and communications, electrical and electronic, and
mechanical.
2 2 Villalonga (2004a, p.482) noted that only 20% of multisegment firms in Compustat were manufacturing-only
firms.
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Using the knowledge subcategories from Table 3 to classify diversification, the majority
of firms in our sample would be considered diversified. We list three different measures of
diversification in Table 4, which varies by how many years of patenting activity we use. If we
use the widest possible measure-utilizing the previous 20 years of patenting activity-only
13% of firms would be classified as "pure-play" firms, meaning that their patents fall within a
single knowledge category. If we use a narrower 5-year window, then 22% of the observations
would consist of single-technology firms. The most restrictive measure would consider only the
current year of patent applications. Even with this high restriction, only 40% of firms-years
would consist of a single technology category.23
The number of patenting years to consider for the purposes of diversification (as opposed
to aggregation for patent stocks) is not entirely straightforward. While SIC industry
classification is based on current-year sales of products, patents provide intellectual property
protection for up to 20 years. Thus, it is theoretically possible that firms will produce products
based on 20-year-old patents. Using current-year patent applications may be too restrictive a
measure for the industries the firm can participate in, especially given the lag time for patent
applications. However, considering that the sample consists of high-tech firms with short cycle
times, we use the previous 5 years worth of patenting activity to measure diversification.
One difficultly with comparing patents to industries is that patent classification is not by
industry code and thus there is not a one-to-one correspondence between patent classes and SIC
industry codes.2 4 However, in terms of measuring diversification, we note that the knowledge
23 There are fewer observations to consider if we examine patenting activity in the current year. Our main sample as
a whole considers fmns that patented any time in the last five years.
24 However, Brian Silverman created a concordance between the International Patent Class (IPC) system and 4-digit
SIC codes, which lists a likelihood table relating the probability that a patent in a particular IPC codes would be used
by a firm in a 4-digit SIC code.
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categories are sufficiently broad to fit into at least one or more SIC industries. For example,
while patents in subcategory 23 (information storage) would correspond with SIC industry 3572
(computer storage devices), patents in subcategory 21 (communications) could apply to at least
three different manufacturing industries (SIC codes 3661, 3663, 3669) and five different service
industries (inside SIC sector 48). If anything, NBER knowledge subcategories are very likely a
conservative estimate of diversification as compared to a measure of diversification that would
be based on matching patents to 4-digit SIC industries.
Taking Tables 5 and 6 together, we observe a trend towards focus among high-
technology firms. This is evident in the decrease in the number of business segments being
reported as well as the number of different technologies that are being patented by each firm.
In Table 5, we divide the sample into single- and multi-segment firms. For multi-
segment firms, the number of reported business segments and the number of technology
categories have trended downward. For single-segment firms, while the median number of
technology categories has remained the same since 1988, the average number of technology
categories has declined. This suggests that large firms that report as single-segment are
becoming more focused. We also note that Tobin's q is higher for single-segment than multi-
segment firms in each year, consistent with the diversification discount reported in the literature
(Lang and Stulz 1994; Berger and Ofek 1995).26
In Table 6, we divide the sample into single-technology firms and multiple technology
firms. The average number of business segments for single-technology firms decreased in the
late 1980s, and then rose again in the late 1990s. This may be due to the change in reporting
25 Using the five years of patenting activity as the measure of technology diversification.
26 However, more recent literature has noted that diversification is not necessary value-destroying. See note 1.
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requirements for business segments in 1998 (from SFAS 14 to SFAS 131), resulting in firms
reporting more segments (Berger and Hann, 2003). The number of different technologies for
multi-segment firms has been falling, from close to 9 in 1984 to about 7 by 2002. Single-
technology firms have consistently higher average Tobin's q, (although the median for single-
technology firms was lower than multi-technology firms the late 1980s as well as 2000-2001.)
We estimate the relationship between the firm's intangible assets and Tobin's q in Table
7. We begin with R&D intensity only, and then include more variables such as advertising
intensity, patent and citation intensity, patent generality, and diversification (both in business
segments or in technology categories).
R&D by itself is correlated with higher market value, although less than existing theory
would predict. In column 1, a one percentage point increase of R&D/assets is correlated with
0.136% more Tobin's q (instead of a theoretical value of 1 percent). Once controls for industry
are included, the estimate for R&D intensity is lower, although still positive. Why R&D by itself
is estimated at less than 1 is interesting. Although Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) estimated a
point estimate for the coefficient of R&D/assets of .563 based on a sample of manufacturing
firms from 1985-1992, they included all industries while our paper focuses on high-technology
firms. Hall (1993) notes that the elasticity of R&D/assets to Tobin's q has fallen considerably in
the 1980s. Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005) find that from 1976-1984 their point estimate for
R&D/assets on log of Tobin's q is 1.754. Our findings for R&D intensity is consistent with the
story that R&D spending is necessary to enter high-tech (or other) industries, but purely
spending more on R&D than other rival firms does not ensure greater value.
We estimate that each extra patent per million dollars of R&D is worth 2.5%-3.6%, and
each additional citation per patent is correlated with about 0.7%-0.9% of market value. While
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adding industry effects does not diminish the impact of additional patent intensity, industry
effects somewhat diminish the coefficient for the value citations. Nevertheless, even in the fixed
effects specification in Column 10, patent and citation intensity are still positively and
significantly correlated with a higher Tobin's q.
Using the linear specifications in Table 7, we do not find that more general patents are
correlated with statistically significant changes in market value. However, given the nonlinear
nature of this variable, if high generality and low generality were correlated with changes in
market value but average generality was not (i.e., if the relationship between generality and
market value were U-shaped or inverse-U-shaped), then we would expect insignificant results
from a linear specification. 27 In fact, the nonlinear specifications in Table 11 reveal positive and
significant changes to market value at either end of generality (either narrow or very general),
which we further elaborate on below.
Finally, we include a dummy variable if the firm reports more than one business segment,
and a dummy variable if the firm is diversified in more than one technology area. We find that
diversification is associated with a decrease of market value. Using business segments, we
replicate the diversification discount documented by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek
(1995). While adding technology diversification in the OLS specifications barely reduces the
negative estimates for business segment diversification, the business-segment diversification
discount disappears in our fixed-effects specification in Column 10.28 In fixed effects though,
technological diversification is negatively and significantly associated with market value.
27 Since the linear specification assumes the same percentage change to the dependent variable for the same amount
of change in our independent variables everywhere in the distribution.
28 Similar to the finding of Campa and Kedia (2002, p. 17 5 1) who found that with fixed effects specifications on the
business segment data, the diversification discount disappeared.
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In Table 8, we use a number of different dependent variables to examine the robustness
of the relationship between intangible assets and market value. Our main dependent variable is
excess value, which is the log of the ratio of the firm's Tobin's q to its imputed q. Imputed q is
the median q of all single-segment firms in the 4-digit SIC code (or the finest level of industry
detail that has at least 5 single-segment firms). For a single-segment firm, imputed q is simply
the median q for its industry. For multi-segment firms, each segment is assigned the imputed q
for its 4-digit SIC code, and then the firm's imputed q as a whole is based on the imputed q from
each of its industry segments, weighted by the firm's assets in each segment. For robustness, we
estimate models with imputed q based on the average industry q rather than the median (Lang
and Stulz 1994; Villalonga 2004a). We also estimate models that drop observations with a log of
imputed value of greater than 1.386 or less than -1.386 (Berger and Ofek 1995; Campa and
Kedia 2002; Villalonga 2004a), implying an excess value of greater than 400% or less than 25%
of its imputed value.
Greater citation intensity is positively and significantly correlated with greater market
value in all specifications of Table 8. Greater patent intensity is associated with an increase in
market value, although in the fixed effects specifications in Columns 3 and 7 the effects are not
statistically significant. Diversification as measured by business segments is not correlated with
positive and statistically significant value in any specification, and is often correlated with
negative and significant decreases in market value (although in fixed effects, this effect is not
significant). In terms of technological diversification, we have conflicting results. Some OLS
specifications show a positive correlation between technological diversification and market
value, while others show a near-zero correlation. The fixed-effects specifications indicate a
negative and statistically significant relationship between technological diversification and
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Tobin's q.
Advertising is not associated with a statistically significant change to market value,
although in several specifications it is correlated with large and negative point estimates. The
most likely explanation is that the value of advertising and thus brand is highly dependent on the
firm's industry, and the most brand-intensive industries (such as consumer nondurables) are not
in our sample. Many of the high-tech companies in our sample are not final goods suppliers to
consumers and are thus less dependent on advertising and brand. The advertising intensity
variable is also highly skewed. While the average ratio of advertising assets to total assets is
1.7%, the median in our sample is less than 0.1%.
In Tables 9 and 10, we list the mean and median Tobin's q as well as the number of
observations in a number of dimensions: 1) quality, proxied by citations per patent; 2) flexibility,
as evidenced by generality; and 3) diversity, as indicated by the number of technology categories
of the firm's patent stock.
As we illustrate in Table 9, single-segment firms have a higher Tobin's q than multi-
segment firms whether they patent in one technology category or in many. We note that firms
with more technology categories are generally correlated with a lower Tobin's q. At the
intersection of business segments and number of technologies, the single-technology, single-
segment firm combination is correlated with the greatest value. For multi-segment firms, being
focused in a single technology category is correlated with the most value, and there is a
noticeable dip in value moving from a single technology to two technology categories. There are
further decreases for very diversified patent bases (8 technologies and above).
We then subdivide the sample according to different sizes of overall patent stock in each
year. The percentiles are 0-50, 50-80, 80-95, and 95 and above. Within each patent stock size
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category, companies that are more focused in terms of technology categories are generally
correlated with more value.29
Table 9 further illustrates that at all levels of technological diversity, higher generality of
a firm's patent stock is associated with more value. There is also evidence of complementarity-
firms with the narrowest patent stocks (low generality) are correlated with the most value when
they are also patenting in just one or two technologies. However, firms in the 9 0th and above
percentile of generality are correlated with the most value when they have patent activity in
several technologies. Interestingly, firms with a highly diverse set of patents (8 or more
technology categories) are not correlated with more value at higher levels of generality.
Patent quality (as proxied by citations per patent) is clearly correlated with higher market
value. We divide the sample into four different categories to measure quality by citations per
patent: percentiles for 0-50, 50-80, 80-95, and 95 and above. Higher percentile groups are
correlated with successively higher levels of Tobin's q. There is evidence of complementarity
between citations and technology categories. Firms in the 9 5 th percentile and above for citations
per patent are correlated with greater value for 3-7 technologies categories instead of one or two
categories. At all other lower levels of cites per patent, there is little additional value (or
negative value) correlated with a more diverse patent base.
In Table 10, we examine the interaction between patent generality and business segments,
size of patent stock, and citations per patent. Firms with general patents are correlated with
higher Tobin's q whether they are single- or multi-segment. At each level of citation intensity,
there also tends to be greater value with either narrow or highly generalized patents than with
29 As the overall patent stock grows in size, Tobin's q decreases. This is likely correlated with firm size effects,
which may indicate the maturity of the markets in which the firm operates. Larger firms grow more slowly than
smaller firms, and so this will be reflected in a lower Tobin's q.
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patents with an average level of generality.
We then use the categories from Table 10 in multivariate regressions in Table 11. We
estimate several different combinations of dependent variables such as the log of Tobin's q or the
log of excess Tobin's q, whether we use median or mean q to compute the industry benchmark,
whether we drop extreme observations (firms with excess Tobin's q of less than 25% or greater
than 400% of the industry), and whether we use OLS or fixed effects.
Our most robust findings concern patent quality. Firms in the 8 0 -9 5th and the 9 5 th
percentile and above in citations per patent are worth significantly more than firms in the bottom
50% of cites/patent, robust to all specifications. In most specifications, the differences in the
coefficients for each of the three groups divided by citations/patent are statistically (as well as
practically) significant from each other.
In every specification, we estimate that firms with highly general patents (in the 9 0 th
percentile and above) are correlated with more value than firms with any other level of generality
of their patent base. This is statistically significant in all but two specifications (Columns 3 and
11). This is consistent with previous scholarship. Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) observed
that information and communications technologies are "general-purpose-technologies," while
Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) noted that of the six major technology fields, patents in the
field of computers and communications (Field 3 from Table 3) were the most generalizable
(based on an analysis of patent data from 1975-1999).
The correlation between technological diversity and value is dramatically different
between the OLS and fixed effects specifications. In OLS, firms with patents in more fields are
correlated with higher market value. However, in the fixed effects specifications as well as the
OLS specifications where extreme-valued observations are dropped, diversity is negatively and
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significantly correlated with lower market value. Higher technological diversity could be
proxying for the size of the firm and its patent base, which may be why the OLS specifications
are so different from those of fixed effects for these variables. The diversity variables were the
only ones whose coefficient estimates changed so dramatically by using fixed effects instead of
OLS, or by dropping the extreme values of Tobin's q.
In Table 12, we illustrate how external change affects the value of patents, as moderated
by the generality and diversity of a firm's patent base. Our results for R&D intensity,
advertising, patent intensity, citations, and diversification are largely unchanged from the
baseline estimates in Tables 7 and 8. Given that there is a large premium for firms with very
high citations per patent, we examine what happens when innovative activity by other firms
move in a different direction from leading firms at the frontier.
We examine the patenting activity in a given year and count the number of citations the
firm receives in all patent applications of that year from any other source other than the firm
itself. In other words, we count the number of non-self-citations to a firm in a given year. To
scale this number, we divide it by the patent stock of the firm. Given that different years will
have greater citation intensities, we re-rank firms each year and code the top 20% of the high-
tech sample as at the frontier of innovation in that year. We analyze what happens the following
year if the firm loses its status at the frontier. We create a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm
was an innovative leader in the previous year and then lost its status in the current year. We then
examine to what extent the diversity and generality of the firm's patents moderate the effects on
market value of losing this status.
In all of our estimates, there is a large, negative effect on market value from receding
from the forefront of innovation. This is statistically significant in almost all of our estimates
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and is robust to fixed effects, use the mean or median q to impute an industry benchmark, or
whether we drop firms with extreme values of Tobin's q relative to their industries. Using OLS,
we estimate that the direct effect of losing technical leadership is approximately 20-32%. Using
the relative excess value to the median of the industry, we estimate a drop from 18-31% using
the full sample, or 13-16% using the reduced sample. We interact this loss with characteristics
of the firm's intangibles. Being a multi-segment firm is associated with a magnification of this
effect (although most estimates are not statistically significant). Being diversified in multiple
technologies does moderate the effect somewhat, although most estimates are not statistically
significant either.
However, having a patent base with a high degree of generality (in the 6 6 h percentile and
above for generality) nullifies the effect almost entirely. This is not the same for firms with
narrow patents (generality below the 3 3 'd percentile).
CONCLUSION
In this work, we examined how the value of high-tech firms is related to the quality,
diversity, and generality of their patent base, and how this value changes when firms with high-
quality patents are no longer at the frontier of innovation. Our results are consistent with the
story that R&D is necessary for entry into certain industries, but that high R&D itself does not
ensure value. Rather, patent intensity as well as citation intensity are correlated with more value.
There are significant premiums of being in the top 5% and 20% of citations per patent. While
there is a modest premium to general patents over narrowly focused patents, the value of
generality is especially significant when the firm is no longer a leader in a given year's
innovation activity. In contrast, the value of diversity is positive but not significant during these
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periods of change, with generality being comparatively more valuable than diversity. One
interpretation of these results is that patents with the greatest generality allow firms to more
easily adapt to the changing technological landscape in times of rapid and potentially disruptive
change. This is especially true for firms in high-tech industries, where technology cycle times
are short and innovation is especially rapid. Future research can examine how other types of
external change affects the value of the firm's intangibles so that we can better understand not
only the value but also the durability of these assets.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample, 1984-2002
Variable Mean Median Minimum 2 5th 7 5th Maximum Std.
Percentile Percentile Deviation
Market Value 2,494.9 126.1 .008 30.7 689.0 461,178.9 12,878.1
Tobin's q 2.21 1.07 .0002 .563 2.18 136.4 4.83
R&D Stock 373.1 31.0 1.00 10.2 110.7 27,796.2 1,628.4
Advertising Stock 22.2 .032 0 0 1.45 5,170.2 164.0
Total Balance Sheet Assets 1,798.1 109.1 .048 34.4 479.7 244,192.5 8,568.0
Patent Stock 146.4 8.69 1 3.35 31.8 11,884.7 685.1
Citation Stock 2,794.0 208.6 0 68.6 722.5 350,486.6 13,119.0
R&D/Assets .492 .294 <.000 .163 .497 46.89 1.18
Advertising Stock/Assets .016 <.000 0 0 .017 1.10 .041
Patents/R&D (MM) .724 .370 <.000 .148 .804 86.7 1.62
Citations/Patent 27.1 19.4 0 12.4 32.7 388.1 26.7
Generality .572 .587 0 .497 .678 1.00 .162
Non-self-citations in one 2.38 1.44 0 .714 2.77 64.8 3.42
application year/patent
Number of Business 1.50 1 1 1 2 10 1.05
Segments
For 9,969 observations with at least one high-tech business segment, at least $1 million of R&D, a patent stock of at
least 1, and at least one patent application in the previous five years.
Table 2: Number of Reported Business Segments, 1984-2002
Number of
Reported
Business
Segments Firm-Years Percent Cumulative
1 7,399 74.22 74.22
2 1,114 11.17 85.39
3 811 8.14 93.53
4 411 4.12 97.65
5 143 1.43 99.09
6 49 0.49 99.58
7 21 0.21 99.79
8 15 0.15 99.94
9 4 0.04 99.98
10 2 0.02 100.00
Total 9,969 100.00
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Table 3: High-Tech Firm Patent Activity by NBER Technology Classification, 1984-2002
% of
Sample by % of Sample
Category Subcategory Category Name Patents by Citations
1 Chemical 11.4 7.1
11 Agriculture, Food, Textiles 0.2 0.0
12 Coating 1.2 0.9
13 Gas 0.1 0.0
14 Organic Compounds 1.2 0.3
15 Resins 1.3 0.8
19 Miscellaneous 7.4 5.0
2 Computers and Communications 37.1 47.2
21 Communications 12.7 15.5
22 Computer Hardware and Software 11.0 13.8
23 Computer Peripherals 4.9 6.2
24 Information Storage 7.3 9.2
25 Electronic Business Methods and software 1.3 2.5
3 Drugs and Medical 2.9 3.9
31 Drugs 1.1 0.6
32 Surgery and Medical Instruments 1.7 3.1
33 Genetics 0.0 0.0
39 Miscellaneous 0.1 0.2
4 Electrical & Electronic 32.9 30.7
41 Electrical Devices 6.9 5.1
42 Electrical Lighting 2.2 1.4
43 Measuring and Testing 3.1 2.6
44 Nuclear & X-rays 1.7 1.2
45 Power Systems 4.0 3.7
46 Semiconductor Devices 10.3 13.5
49 Miscellaneous 4.6 3.2
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5 Mechanical 10.3 7.5
51 Material Processing and Handling 2.6 1.9
52 Metal Working 2.1 1.5
53 Motors, Engines, and Parts 0.9 0.5
54 Optics 2.0 1.7
55 Transportation 0.6 0.3
59 Miscellaneous 2.0 1.6
6 Others 5.4 3.5
61 Agriculture, Husbandry, Food 0.2 0.0
62 Amusement Devices 0.0 0.1
63 Apparel & Textile 0.2 0.0
64 Earth Working & Wells 0.2 0.2
65 Furniture, House Fixtures 0.3 0.2
66 Heating 0.4 0.2
67 Pipes & Joints 0.2 0.1
68 Receptacles 0.4 0.2
69 Miscellaneous 3.4 2.3
N = 9,969 observations. The sample consists of firms with at least one high-tech business segment, at least $1
million of R&D, a patent stock of at least 1, and at least one patent application in the previous five years.
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Table 4: Diversification of Sample based on NBER Technology Subcategories, 1984-2002
Based on 20 years of Patenting Based on Current Year of Patenting
Activity Based on 5 years of Patenting Activity Activity
Tech Firm-
Categories Years Percent Cumulative Firm-Years Percent Cumulative Firm-Years Percent Cumulative
1,292
1,381
1,257
979
778
611
458
347
285
238
215
169
192
132
126
116
105
110
78
12.96
13.85
12.61
9.82
7.80
6.12
4.59
3.48
2.86
2.29
2.16
1.70
1.93
1.32
1.26
1.16
1.05
1.10
0.78
0.72
0.58
0.71
0.96
0.69
0.67
0.80
0.43
0.80
0.58
0.69
0.80
0.59
0.98
0.39
0.37
0.24
12.96
26.81
39.42
49.24
57.05
63.18
67.77
71.25
74.11
76.40
78.55
80.25
82.17
83.50
84.76
85.93
86.98
88.08
88.87
89.58
90.17
90.88
91.84
92.94
93.21
94.01
94.44
95.25
95.83
96.52
97.32
97.91
98.90
99.29
99.66
99.90
2,226
1,848
1,334
912
690
489
315
229
222
179
157
111
22.23
18.54
13.38
9.15
6.92
4.91
3.16
2.30
2.23
1.80
1.57
1.11
0.94
0.73
0.80
0.76
0.64
0.71
0.67
0.82
0.64
0.70
0.60
0.68
0.65
0.55
0.59
0.42
0.37
0.42
0.22
0.17
0.25
0.12
0.09
0.03
22.23
40.87
54.25
63.40
70.32
75.22
78.38
80.68
82.91
84.70
86.28
87.39
88.33
89.07
89.87
90.63
91.27
91.99
92.66
93.48
94.12
94.82
95.43
96.11
96.76
97.31
97.90
98.32
98.70
99.12
99.34
99.51
99.76
99.88
99.97
100.00
2,924
1,441
794
509
316
232
172
125
111
99
75
71
38.62
19.03
10.49
6.72
4.17
3.06
2.27
1.65
1.47
1.31
0.99
0.94
0.88
0.85
0.82
0.66
0.73
0.63
0.59
0.50
0.57
0.58
0.44
0.49
0.29
0.33
0.29
0.26
0.17
0.13
0.01
0.04
0.01
38.62
59.65
68.13
74.85
79.03
82.09
84.36
86.01
87.48
88.79
89.78
90.72
91.60
92.45
93.26
93.92
94.65
95.29
95.88
96.38
96.95
97.53
97.97
98.45
98.75
99.08
99.37
99.63
99.80
99.93
99.95
99.99
100.00
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a, 0.1 1.00.- -- -- - - -
Total 9,969 100.00 9,969 100.00 7,572 100.00
The sample consists of firms with at least one high-tech business segment, at least $1 million of R&D, a patent stock
of at least 1, and at least one patent application in the previous five years.
Table 5: Summary of Single-Segment and Multi-Segment Firms in Sample, 1984-2002
Single-Segment
Tech
Categories Assets Tobin's q
Year Firms Segments Avg.
1984 218 1 4.90
1985 241 1 4.88
1986 262 1 4.90
1987 275 1 4.97
1988 276 1 5.16
1989 282 1 5.13
1990 277 1 5.11
1991 289 1 4.83
1992 335 1 4.57
1993 392 1 4.51
1994 405 1 4.75
1995 468 1 4.77
1996 583 1 4.57
1997 621 1 4.49
1998 505 1 3.95
1999 505 1 3.56
2000 519 1 3.73
2001 511 1 3.92
2002 436 1 4.27
Avg. 1 4.48
Med. Avg.
2 779.9
2 1,008.9
2 955.1
3 1,149.1
3 1,202.7
3 1,299.5
3 1,255.4
3 1,243.9
3 1,013.0
3 1,001.3
3 1,054.2
3 1,212.5
3 1,219.2
3 1,202.0
3 621.2
3 1,011.0
3 814.3
3 740.1
3 653.8
3 1,043.7
Med Avg. Med
48.9 1.35 .77
63.4 1.30 .90
62.0 1.44 .84
69.4 1.47 .76
70.4 1.42 .72
77.6 1.26 .70
75.4 1.10 .64
93.8 1.56 .84
64.1 1.50 .92
68.1 1.93 1.15
79.7 1.96 1.32
84.3 2.48 1.68
78.8 2.50 1.52
80.9 2.48 1.59
72.6 3.24 1.37
82.9 8.02 3.39
127.6 3.57 1.76
124.6 2.28 1.54
108.6 1.88 .97
83.1 2.50 1.21
Multi-Segment
Tech Categories Assets Tobin's q
Avg.
Firms Segments Avg. Med. Avg. Med. Avg. Med.
146 3.40 10.32 7 1,703.4 206.9 .71 .57
140 3.36 9.90 6 1,803.9 197.9 .81 .68
135 3.41 10.13 7 2,605.6 256.5 .84 .69
114 3.30 10.38 6 3,222.9 243.8 .93 .68
104 3.12 9.99 7 2,502.2 235.5 .86 .68
88 3.00 10.27 7 2,062.6 198.0 .81 .60
85 3.07 10.86 8 2,533.1 319.5 .58 .49
84 3.01 10.99 9 3,228.4 261.2 .73 .61
100 2.96 9.69 6 2,723.8 190.5 .92 .73
105 2.96 10.36 7 3,242.4 337.1 1.04 .77
103 2.92 9.93 7 3,282.1 263.2 1.07 .78
116 2.88 9.07 6 2,749.5 233.3 1.47 1.05
119 2.80 9.52 6 3,827.9 284.9 1.49 1.07
112 2.90 10.31 6 5,321.9 376.8 1.66 1.16
196 2.72 8.01 4 3,528.0 317.5 1.64 1.12
213 2.72 8.19 4 4,435.9 341.0 3.50 1.35
208 2.77 8.61 4.5 6,444.3 389.2 1.89 1.15
205 2.78 9.17 5 6,900.8 506.8 1.41 1.04
197 2.91 9.27 5 6,808.4 490.0 1.15 .80
2.97 9.51 6 3,969.9 317.8 1.37 .83
N = 9,969 observations. The sample consists of firms with at least one high-tech business segment, at least $1 million of R&D, a patent stock of at least 1, and at
least one patent application in the previous five years.
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Table 6: Summary of Sample by Technology Diversification, 1984-2002
Single-Technology
Business
Segments Assets Tobin's q
Avg. Tech.
Year Firms Categories Avg.
1984 77 1 1.45
1985 95 1 1.33
1986 96 1 1.45
1987 84 1 1.30
1988 80 1 1.25
1989 83 1 1.16
1990 86 1 1.14
1991 80 1 1.16
1992 110 1 1.21
1993 114 1 1.10
1994 117 1 1.26
1995 127 1 1.22
1996 168 1 1.11
1997 155 1 1.10
1998 166 1 1.28
1999 151 1 1.23
2000 156 1 1.29
2001 149 1 1.28
2002 132 1 1.39
Avg. 1 1.24
Med.
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Avg. Med.
74.1 28.9
346.3 30.9
214.9 32.7
215.0 29.5
198.2 26.2
52.0 26.3
95.3 32.5
234.5 29.5
201.1 31.8
192.2 31.1
520.1 37.3
152.3 42.0
128.8 46.0
136.9 41.1
262.8 45.3
241.3 57.4
375.7 76.7
1,211.4 53.3
1,179.1 33.4
344.2 38.4
Avg.
1.20
1.38
1.48
1.77
1.76
1.49
1.12
2.18
1.77
2.13
2.31
2.83
2.64
2.51
3.59
9.21
3.44
2.08
2.37
2.73
Med.
.71
.86
.74
.67
.66
.69
.64
1.02
1.11
1.28
1.38
1.77
1.82
1.48
1.20
3.85
1.47
1.17
1.19
1.20
Multi-Technology
Business
Segments Assets Tobin's q
Avg. Tech.
Firms Categories Avg. Med. Avg. Med. Avg. Med.
287 8.74 2.10 1.00 1,443.5 126.3 1.06 .67
286 8.68 2.04 1.00 1,625.7 139.8 1.03 .76
301 8.48 1.94 1.00 1,929.2 140.7 1.16 .77
305 8.09 1.78 1.00 2,177.8 148.7 1.18 .76
300 7.94 1.67 1.00 1,921.1 150.3 1.14 .70
287 7.90 1.57 1.00 1,894.3 147.8 1.05 .68
276 8.16 1.59 1.00 2,010.3 163.5 .94 .56
293 7.65 1.53 1.00 2,088.4 168.4 1.15 .73
325 7.32 1.53 1.00 1,805.2 156.2 1.25 .82
382 7.14 1.51 1.00 1,851.0 141.4 1.64 .96
391 7.21 1.43 1.00 1,793.5 143.0 1.63 1.07
457 6.90 1.42 1.00 1,894.5 155.1 2.14 1.43
534 6.78 1.37 1.00 2,137.4 125.5 2.24 1.38
578 6.56 1.34 1.00 2,281.9 136.5 2.31 1.53
535 6.46 1.54 1.00 1,874.9 146.2 2.60 1.29
567 6.08 1.59 1.00 2,585.6 149.1 5.81 2.13
571 6.36 1.57 1.00 3,155.0 230.3 2.93 1.52
567 6.60 1.57 1.00 2,875.2 229.4 2.00 1.34
501 7.13 1.64 1.00 3,045.8 237.1 1.45 .87
7.16 1.58 1.00 2,216.0 160.1 2.06 1.04
N = 9,969 observations. The sample consists of firms with at least one high-tech business segment, at least $1 million of R&D, a patent stock of at least 1, and at
least one patent application in the previous five years.
Table 7: Tobin's q as a Function of Intangible Assets, 1984-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FE
Ln(q) Ln(q) Ln(q) Ln(q) Ln(q) Ln(q) Ln(q) Ln(q) Ln(q) Ln(q)
R&D/Assets .136 .133 .134 .126 .126 .119 .120 .116 .115 .089
(.016) (.016) (.016) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.013)
Advertising Stock/Assets .394 .399 .202 .198 .065 .067 .048 -.107 -.911
(.584) (.584) (.575) (.574) (.574) (.573) (.591) (.590) (.752)
Patents/R&D (MMs) .029 .030 .030 .030 .030 .034 .036 .025
(.006) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.013) (.013) (.019)
Citations/Patent .009 .009 .008 .009 .007 .006 .007
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Generality .069 .068 .065 .108 .156 -.093
(.113) (.112) (.114) (.112) (.110) (.153)
Multisegment Firm Dummy = 1 -.232 -.232 -.186 -.140 -.001
(.042) (.042) (.048) (.049) (.054)
Technological Diversification = 1 .009 .038 .030 -.133
(.044) (.044) (.043) (.043)
No Advertising Dummy = 1 .131 .131 .131 .131 .129 .129 .129 .169 .186
(.046) (.046) (.043) (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) (.031)
Number of Observations 9,969 9,969 9,969 9,969 9,969 9,969 9,969 9,969 9,969 9,969
R-squared .128 .131 .132 .177 .177 .184 .184 .218 .356
Controls Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
3-Digit SIC 4-Digit SIC
The sample consists of firms with at least one high-tech business segment, at least $1 million of R&D, a patent stock of at least 1, and at least one patent
application in the previous five years. The dependent variable is the log of Tobin's q as measured by Chung and Pruitt (1994). Robust standard errors
clustered by firm in parentheses.
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Table 8: Different Measures of Excess Value as a Function of Intangible Assets, 1984-2002
R&D/Assets
Advertising
Stock/Assets
Patents/R&D (MMs)
Citations/Patent
Generality
Multisegment Firm
Dummy = 1
Technological
Diversification = 1
No Advertising
Dummy = 1
(1)
OLS
Segment
data
.113
(.014)
-.051
(.529)
(2)
OLS
Segment
data
.013
(.015)
.212
(.275)
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
FE FE OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS
Segment Segment Primary Primary Primary Primary Segment Segment
data data SIC SIC SIC SIC data data
.088 -.009 .113 .007 .089 .003 .106 .068
(.014) (.025) (.015) (.016) (.013) (.029) (.016) (.013)
-1.05 -.370 .077 .096 -.903 -.422 -.928 -.286
(.673) (.352) (.542) (.286) (.682) (.403) (.585) (.301)
.031 .017 .025 .020 .032 .016 .023
(.011) (.006) (.021) (.012) (.011) (.006) (.019)
.006 .003 .006 .002 .006 .003 .006
(.001) (.000) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.000) (.001)
.021
(.011)
.002
(.001)
.026
(.010)
.004
(.001)
.012
(.005)
.003
(.000)
(11)
FE
Segment
data
.072
(.019)
-1.13
(.889)
.027
(.020)
.007
(.001)
(12)
FE
Segment
data
.074
(.019)
-.911
(.399)
.012
(.008)
.003
(.000)
.103 .151 -.025 .109 .132 .125 -.092 -.009 .117 .187 -.066 .192
(.104) (.065) (.166) (.119) (.105) (.068) (.157) (.120) (.119) (.079) (.203) (.130)
-.185 -.121 -.059 -.017 -.069 -.066 -.004
(.043) (.027) (.057) (.042) (.041) (.028) (.054)
.061 .021 -.119 -.100 .062 .044 -.117
(.042) (.024) (.042) (.030) (.042) (.025) (.042)
-.024
(.043)
-.078
(.030)
-.148
(.049)
.143
(.046)
-.124
(.029)
-.016
(.027)
.125 .071 .168 .125 .140 .061 .147 .072 .159 .107
(.042) (.026) (.088) (.069) (.042) (.026) (.042) (.074) (.048) (.028)
-.027
(.070)
-.124
(.051)
-.039
(.048)
-.115
(.031)
.239 .134
(.113) (.073)
Number of Obs.
R-squared
Sample
9,969 8,384 9,969 8,384 9,969 8,472 9,969 8,472 9,969 6,842 9,969 6,842
.063 .039
Median q Median q
Drop
extreme q
.054 .034
Median q Median q
Drop
extreme q
.057 .029
Median q Median q
Drop
Extreme q
.005 .029 .181 .062 .215 .066
Median Median q
q Drop
extreme q
Mean q Mean q
Drop
extreme q
Mean q Mean q
Drop
extreme q
The sample consists of firms with at least one high-tech business segment, at least $1 million of R&D, a patent stock of at least 1, and at least one patent
application in the previous five years. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. A full set of year dummies are included in each estimation. For
Columns 1-4, the dependent variable is the log of the ratio of Tobin's q to imputed q. Imputed q is based on the median value of q for single-segment firms in
each of the firm's segments, and then weighted by the firm's book value of assets in each segment. In Columns 5-8, the dependent variable is the log of the ratio
of Tobin's q to the median q for the firm's primary SIC. In Columns 9-12, the dependent variable is the log of the ratio of Tobin's q to imputed q. Imputed q is
based on the mean value of q for single-segment firms in each of the firm's segments, and then weighted by the firm's book value of assets in each segment. The
primary industry or single-segment q values are based on the narrowest SIC group with at least 5 firms. Extreme q is defined as the log of excess q being greater
than 1.386 or less than -1.386, implying excess value of greater than 400% or less than 25% of imputed q.
Table 9: Mean and Median Tobin's q by Technological Diversity, 1984-2002
Number of Technology Categories
1 2 3-7 8-15 16+ Total
2.85 2.85 2.41 1.81 1.40 2.50
Single Segment (1.29) (1.34) (1.23) (.997) (.893) (1.21)
{1,897} {1,534} (2,902} {677) {389} (7,399)
2.13 1.36 1.44 1.15 1.06 1.37
Multi Segment (.933) (.767) (.834) (.814) (.805) (.823)
{329} {314} {445} {468} {621} {2,570}
1 2 3-7 8-15 16+ Total
th 2.77 2.68 2.08 --- --- 2.560-50t Percentile Patent (1.17) (1.25) (1.14) --- --- (1.18)
stock (2.097} {1,556} {1,332} {1} {0} (4,986)
th 2.13 2.13 2.14 1.04 1.01 1.99
50-80 Percentile (1.41) (1.17) (1.07) (.646) (.901) (1.01)
{124} {290} {2,156} (415} {7} (2,992)
th 4.07 --- 3.04 1.78 1.02 1.74
Ptent sPteorcentile (4.22) --- (1.51) (1.08) (.797) (.995){5} {2) (251) (720} {516) (1,494)
-th --- --- 5.24 1.37 1.45
9th+(2.92) (.870) (.881)
stock {0} {0} {0} {9} {487} {497}
0-10 Percentile
Generality
10-33 Percentile
Generality
33 r-66 tPercentile
Generality
66 t-90 thPercentile
Generality
90 th+ Percentile
Generality
1
2.15
(1.04)
(446)
2.77
(1.12)
{469}
2.56
(1.00)
{470)
3.41
(1.44)
(507)
2.72
(1.49)
{339}
2
2.20
(1.24)
{238)
2.70
(1.14)
{387)
2.67
(.998)
(458)
2.50
(1.28)
(471)
2.80
(1.64)
{301)
3-7
1.73
(1.01)
{231}
1.91
(1.04)
{883}
2.09
(1.13)
{1,238}
2.46
(1.22)
(1,061)
2.65
(1.42)
{350}
8-15
1.74
(1.57)
{58}
1.35
(.963)
(325)
1.64
(.879)
{497)
1.53
(.820)
{267)
1.46
(1.16)
{16}
16+
1.74
(1.82)
{16}
1.40
(.823)
{254}
1.08
(.826)
{646)
1.31
(.842)
{104)
Total
2.04
(1.13)
{998)
2.09
(1.02)
(2,310)
1.97
(.951)
{3,309)
2.52
(1.20)
(2,410)
2.70
(1.47)
(1,006)
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0-50 Percentile Cites
per Patent
809th
50-80 thPercentile Cites
per Patent
80-95 thPercentile Cites
per Patent
95 th+ Percentile Cites
per Patent
1.90
(.846)
{1,002}
3.18
(1.32)
{559}
3.28
(1.60)
{430}
4.29
(2.16)
{235}
1.79
(.976)
{821}
2.78
(1.42)
{506}
3.46
(1.53)
{369}
4.22
(2.05)
{152}
3-7
1.71
(.920)
{1,860}
2.28
(1.23)
{1,208}
3.01
(1.55)
{553}
4.76
(2.49)
{119}
8-15
1.12
(.789)
{638}
1.98
(.986)
{381}
2.41
(1.44)
{107}
2.74 2.60 2.19 1.54 1.19 2.21
All (1.20) (1.24) (1.13) (.910) (.837) (1.07)
{2,226) {1,848) {3,740} (1,145) {1,010) {9,969)
The first number in each cell is the mean q for each group, the second number in parentheses is the median q for the
group, and the third number in braces is the number of observations in each group. Percentiles are reranked each year.
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16+
.974
(.798)
{659}
1.50
(.908)
{249}
2.46
(1.05)
{35}
Total
1.59
(.864)
(4,980}
2.41
(1.18)
(2,987)
3.14
(1.55)
{1,494}
4.37
(2.20)
(508)
Table 10: Mean and Median Tobin's q by Generality
Generality
0-0h 103rd rd th th th gth0-10 th 10-33" 33 r-66 th 66 t-90 th90 th+
Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Total
2.21 2.39 2.26 2.86 2.82 2.50
Single Segment (1.22) (1.12) (1.06) (1.39) (1.60) (1.21)
{802) {1,620} {2,258} {1,906) {848} {7,399)
1.28 1.38 1.35 1.23 2.06 1.37
Multi-Segment (.908) (.789) (.827) (.778) (.980) (.823)
{187} {690) {1,051} {504} {158) (2,570}
th0' 103rd rd th th th th+0-10 th 10-33d 33 r-66 th 66 t-90 th90 th+
Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Total
th 2.10 2.53 2.53 2.78 2.64 2.56
050 Percentile Patent (1.05) (1.06) (1.04) (1.33) (1.47) (1.18)
{693} {927} {1,1601 {1,386} {838} {4,986}
th 1.87 1.73 1.79 2.35 3.09 1.9950-80t Percentile Patent (1.05) (1.01) (.911) (1.12) (1.46) (1.01)
stock {225} {819} {1,082} {724} {160} {2,992}
th 1.93 1.96 1.64 1.62 1.34 1.74
8t-95 PerCentile Patent (1.69) (1.05) (.938) (.880) (1.48) (.995){62} {426} {728) {281} {8} (1,484}
th 1.75 1.61 1.30 2.86 --- 1.45
95t+ Percentile Patent (1.78) (.868) (.861) (1.27) - (.881)
stock {91 {138} {339} {19} {0} {497)
-th rd rd th th th th+0-10 th 10-33 rd 33'd-66 th 66 th-90 th90 th+
Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Total
0th 1.80 1.51 1.40 1.74 2.07 1.59
0-50 Percentile Cites (1.05) (.823) (.823) (.888) (1.05) (.864)
{609} {1,304} {1,777} {965} {351} {4,980}
th 2.22 2.21 2.45 2.62 2.26 2.41
50-80 Percentile Cites (1.20) (1.22) (1.04) (1.24) (1.53) (1.18)
{235} {652) {1,054} {785} {279) {2,987)
th 2.75 3.82 3.04 2.96 3.09 3.1480-95 Percentile Cites (1.24) (1.72) (1.39) (1.54) (1.74) (1.55)
{114) {264) {399) {498} {226} {1,494}
th 2.56 4.41 3.11 5.27 4.40 4.37
95 +nPercentile Cites per (2.01) (2.60) (1.64) (2.57) (1.91) (2.20)
{31} {90) {79) {162} {150) {508)
- th rd rd th th th th0-10 th 10-33 r, 33 -d66 th 66 t-90 th90 th+
Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Percentile Total
2.04 2.08 1.97 2.51 2.70 2.21
Total (1.13) (1.02) (.951) (1.20) (1.46) (1.07)
{989) {2,310) {3,309) {2,410} {1,006) (9,969)
The first number in each cell is the mean q for each group, the second number in parentheses is the median q for
the group, and the third number in braces is the number of observations in each group. Percentiles are reranked
each year.
151
Table 11: Patent Quality, Generality, and Diversity and Tobin's q, 1984-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE
Ln(q) Ln(q) Ln(q) Segment Segment Segment Segment Segment Segment Segment Segment
Data Data Data Data Data Data Data Data
R&D/Assets .117 .115 .087 .113 .013 .087 -.010 .107 .067 .071 .075
Advertising
Stock/Assets
Patents/R&D
Multisegment Firm
(D=1)
No Advertising (D=1)
2 Technology
Categories (D=1)
3-7 Technology
Categories (D=1)
8-15 Technology
Categories (D=1)
16+ Technology
Categories (D=1)
Generality in 0 -10 th
percentile (D=1)
Generality in 10-33rd
percentile (D=1)
Generality in 66 -90th
percentile (D=l)
Generality in 90 th+
percentile (D=1)
Cites per patent in 5 0 1h-
thh
80' Percentile (D= 1)
Cites per patent in 80'-
95th Percentile (D= 1)
Cites per patent in 9 5th
Percentile (D= 1)
Number of
Observations
R-squared
Controls
(.013)
.047
(.569)
(.014)
-.170
(.585)
(.013)
-.996
(.755)
(.013)
-.072
(.529)
(.016)
.174
(.273)
(.014)
-1.14
(.675)
(.025)
-.428
(.350)
(.015)
-.907
(.580)
(.013)
-.321
(.304)
(.019)
-1.19
(.893)
(.019)
-.986
(.394)
.032 .037 .028 .031 .018 .027 .022 .025 .013 .030 .013
(.012) (.014) (.021) (.012) (.007) (.022) (.013) (.022) (.022) (.021) (.009)
-.199 -.141 .006 -.187 -.111 -.050 -.008 -.181 -.115 -.017 -.029
(.043) (.048) (.053) (.043) (.028) (.057) (.042) (.050) (.030) (.069) (.048)
.134 .176 .183 .132 .074 .166 .116 .171 .107 .239 .130
(.042) (.043) (.094) (.042) (.026) (.086) (.067) (.047) (.028) (.111) (.073)
.014
(.049)
.021
(.048)
.029
(.066)
.013
(.049)
.038
(.047)
.047
(.062)
-.086
(.045)
-.202
(.052)
-.333
(.076)
.028
(.048)
.065
(.046)
.106
(.062)
.032
(.029)
.036
(.031)
-.001
(.042)
-.081
(.043)
-.173
(.052)
-.284
(.077)
-.058
(.031)
-.139
(.035)
-.269
(.056)
.031
(.054)
.145
(.052)
.235
(.072)
.017
(.031)
-.010
(.031)
-.056
(.046)
-.077
(.052)
-.200
(.062)
-.293
(.093)
-.072
(.032)
-.173
(.036)
-.262
(.060)
.111 .231 -.261 .240 .090 -.297 -.247 .392 .014 -.145 -.235
(.066) (.073) (.117) (.066) (.044) (.118) (.086) (.076) (.048) (.137) (.081)
.120 .066 .080 .068 .029 .040 .024 .049 -.029 .092 -.064
(.063) (.058) (.067) (.059) (.038) (.073) (.053) (.068) (.050) (.091) (.057)
.071 .047 .078 .058 .004 .083 .024
(.041) (.042) (.036) (.041) (.026) (.039) (.028)
.090 .098 .042 .079 .068 .052 .048
(.043) (.042) (.044) (.041) (.026) (.044) (.030)
.176 .158 .086 .155 .101 .117 .087
(.061) (.060) (.073) (.056) (.036) (.074) (.050)
.044
(.047)
.059
(.046)
.115
(.064)
.004
(.029)
.046
(.027)
.065
(.038)
.080
(.047)
.077
(.050)
.143
(.086)
.015
(.030)
.029
(.030)
.041
(.048)
.308 .238 .082 .203 .091 .066 .016 .184 .060 .097 .018
(.039) (.040) (.039) (.037) (.024) (.040) (.029) (.043) (.024) (.049) (.029)
.521 .408 .239 .341 .182 .200 .108 .278 .153 .274 .112
(.054) (.055) (.064) (.051) (.030) (.065) (.044) (.057) (.034) (.075) (.045)
.791 .625 .412 .566 .284 .370 .140 .357 .287 .349 .220
(.082) (.086) (.097) (.079) (.050) (.095) (.073) (.087) (.056) (.112) (.076)
9,969 9,969 9,969 9,969 8,384 9,969 8,384 9,969 6,842 9,969 6,842
.191 .249 .137 .068 .042 .056 .004 .186 .062 .215 .215
Year Year
4-Digit SIC
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
Median q Median q
Drop
Extreme q
Median q Median q
Drop
Extreme q
Mean q Mean q
Drop
Extreme q
Mean q Mean q
Drop
Extreme q
The sample consists of firms with at least one high-tech business segment, at least $1 million of R&D, a patent stock of at
least 1, and at least one patent application in the previous five years. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in
parentheses. In Columns 1-3, the dependent variable is the log of Tobin's q. For Columns 4-11, the dependent variable is
the log of the ratio of Tobin's q to imputed q. Imputed q is based on the value of q for single-segment firms in each of the
firm's segments, and then weighted by the fim's book value of assets in each segment. In Columns 4-7, imputed q is
based on median q, in Columns 8-11, it is based on mean q. The single-segment q values are based on the narrowest SIC
group with at least 5 fimns. Extreme q is defined as the log of excess q being greater than 1.386 or less than -1.386,
implying excess value of greater than 400% or less than 25% of imputed q.
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Table 12: Loss of Technological Leadership and Tobin's q, 1984-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
OLS 015 FE 015 O1 FE FE 01 O1 FE FE
Ln(q) Ln(q) Ln(q) Seg. Seg. Seg. Seg. Seg. Seg. Seg. Seg.
Data Data Data Data Data Data Data Data
R&D/Assets
Advertising
Stock/Assets
Patents/R&D
(MMs)
Cites/Patent
Multisegment
Firm Dummy = 1
Multiple Tech
Categories
No Advertising
Dummy =1
Loss of Leadership
Loss of Leadership
* Multi-tech firm
Loss of Leadership
* Multisegment
Loss of leadership
* High Generality
Loss of Leadership
* Low Generality
Dummy:
Generality High
Dummy:
Generality Low
Number of
Observations
R-squared
Controls
.120 .115 .089 .113 .013 .088 -.007 .107 .067 .073 .075
(.014) (.014) (.013) (.014) (.016) (.014) (.025) (.016) (.013) (.019) (.019)
.022 -.140 -.944 -.092 .172 -1.10 -.401 -.952 -.303 -1.16 -.943
(.571) (.588) (.747) (.527) (.270) (.668) (.350) (.584) (.299) (.885) (.394)
.030
(.012)
.008
(.001)
.037
(.013)
.006
(.001)
.025
(.019)
.006
(.001)
.031
(.011)
.006
(.001)
.018
(.006)
.003
(.000)
.024
(.021)
.006
(.001)
.020
(.011)
.002
(.001)
.026
(.011)
.004
(.001)
.012
(.005)
.003
(.000)
.027
(.019)
.007
(.001)
.011
(.008)
.003
(.001)
-.226 -.134 -.006 -.176 -.113 -.056 -.014 -.145 -.120 -.028 -.035
(.042) (.050) (.054) (.042) (.028) (.057) (.042) (.050) (.029) (.070) (.049)
.012 .034 -.134 .061 .025 -.119 -.100 .147 -.008 -.118 -.114
(.043) (.041) (.042) (.041) (.025) (.041) (.029) (.046) (.027) (.051) (.031)
.126 .166 .183 .123 .069 .166 .124 .157 .105 .238 .132
(.043) (.044) (.095) (.042) (.026) (.088) (.068) (.047) (.028) (.112) (.072)
-.321 -.287 -.204 -.314 -.157 -.182 -.131 -.234 -.099 -.132 -.137
(.131) (.131) (.096) (.125) (.088) (.097) (.081) (.148) (.092) (.108) (.080)
.147 .105 .058 .151 .072 .050 .059 .012 .039 -053 .027
(.129) (.126) (.095) (.121) (.079) (.097) (.074) (.142) (.088) (.107) (.074)
-.072 -.081 -.076 -.175 -.106 -.148 -.092 -.138 -.045 -.061 -.059
(.119) (.119) (.091) (.117) (.085) (.091) (.068) (.151) (.087) (.106) (.078)
.250 .240 .162 .283 .143 .203 .148 .199 .139 .126 .142
(.116) (.116) (.088) (.111) (.078) (.086) (.070) (.139) (.084) (.105) (.073)
.082 .066 .003 .070 .075 -.011 .023 -.018 .047 -.055 .077
(.128) (.126) (.098) (.123) (.081) (.098) (.070) (.136) (.088) (.110) (.077)
.091 .086 .044 .061 .067 .054 .058 .019 .063 .082 .061
(.040) (.041) (.045) (.039) (.025) (.044) (.030) (.044) (.026) (.051) (.030)
.061 .024 .078 .030
(.039) (.039) (.037) (.38)
-.001 .076 .026 .005 -.002 .082 .002
(.024) (.039) (.028) (.045) (.027) (.048) (.029)
9,969 9,969 9,969 9,969 8,384 9,969 8,384 9,969 6,842 9,969 6,842
.186 .246 .138 .065 .041 .056 .004 .182 .063 .217 .215
Year Year
4-Digit
SIC
Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year Year
Median q Median q
Drop
Extreme q
Median q Median q
Drop
Extreme q
Mean q Mean q
Drop
Extreme q
Mean q Mean q
Drop
Extreme q
The sample consists of firms with at least one high-tech business segment, at least $1 million of R&D, a patent stock of
at least 1, and at least one patent application in the previous five years. Robust standard errors clustered by firm in
parentheses. In Columns 1-3, the dependent variable is the log of Tobin's q. For Columns 4-11, the dependent variable
is the log of the ratio of Tobin's q to imputed q. Imputed q is based on the value of q for single-segment firms in each
of the firm's segments, and then weighted by the firm's book value of assets in each segment. In Columns 4-7, imputed
q is based on median q, in Columns 8-11, it is based on mean q. The single-segment q values are based on the
narrowest SIC group with at least 5 firms. Extreme q is defined as the log of excess q being greater than 1.386 or less
than -1.386, implying excess value of greater than 400% or less than 25% of imputed q.
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